LSN โ€” Local Sovereign Network

๐Ÿ”ด CRITICAL โ€” Organized Criminal Infrastructure

W1n LTD โ€” Bulletproof Hosting Network

AS42237 ยท Multi-ASN bulletproof hosting provider operating SSH proxy botnets, counterfeit e-commerce, and illegal content hosting
Bulletproof Hosting SSH Proxy Botnet Counterfeit E-commerce Tor Exit Node VPN/Proxy Farm ๐Ÿ‡ฌ๐Ÿ‡ง UK Shell ๐Ÿ‡บ๐Ÿ‡ฆ UA Operator ๐Ÿ‡ท๐Ÿ‡บ RU Partner ๐Ÿ‡ธ๐Ÿ‡ช SE Hosting

๐Ÿข Entity Profile

FieldValue
Legal NameW1n LTD
RIPE OrgORG-WL303-RIPE
Registered AddressDept 302, 43 Owston Road, Carcroft, Doncaster DN6 8DA, United Kingdom
Contact Role"Anastasiia" AA39751-RIPE โ€” role object, not a named person
Phone+380 502 309 318 โ€” ๐Ÿ‡บ๐Ÿ‡ฆ Ukraine (Vodafone UA mobile)
Abuse Emailabuse@w1n.nl โ€” Netherlands domain (.nl) for a UK company
Commercial Brandswedendedicated.com โ€” "Sweden Dedicated Servers"
ASNAS42237 (registered 2017-08-10, LIR since 2022)
Maintainerlir-uk-win-1-MNT
RIPE Created2022-07-07 (company) / 2023-02-25 (attack subnet)
UK Companies HouseNot found โ€” likely dissolved, dormant, or never properly registered
๐Ÿšฉ Red Flags: UK-registered company with Ukrainian phone, Netherlands abuse domain, Swedish geolocation, Russian partner ASN, virtual office address (Dept 302). Classic jurisdictional arbitrage pattern for bulletproof hosting.

๐ŸŒ Network Infrastructure โ€” 18 Announced Prefixes

ASNNameOwnerCountryRole
AS42237w1nW1n LTD๐Ÿ‡ฌ๐Ÿ‡งPrimary ASN โ€” hosting, botnets
AS47508RaBit_Link_KatmirW1n LTD๐Ÿ‡ฌ๐Ÿ‡งSecondary ASN
AS58062StarNetworkW1n LTD๐Ÿ‡ฌ๐Ÿ‡งAdditional capacity
AS207713GIR-ASGlobal Internet Solutions LLC๐Ÿ‡ท๐Ÿ‡บRussian partner โ€” plausible deniability

All operate under the AS-ICME AS-SET. Upstream transit: AS3399 (355 routes, primary), AS6939 Hurricane Electric (97 routes), AS20473 Vultr.

๐Ÿ—บ๏ธ Infrastructure Map โ€” What's on Each Subnet

185.246.128.0/24 ๐Ÿ”ด
.133 โ€” SSH proxy bot (our attacker) ยท SMB+WinRM exposed
.200 โ€” crocs-diskont.ru (fake Crocs store)
.50 โ€” laendliapotheke.ch (Swiss pharmacy โ€” possible victim or cover)
.2, .25 โ€” Windows SMB boxes (bot fleet)
Proxy BotFraudSMB
185.246.130.0/24
.130 โ€” swedendedicated.com, w1n.nl, icmenet.com (company servers)
.20 โ€” 2nd honeypot attacker (brute-force, GreyNoise: MALICIOUS)
.133 โ€” 21 unpatched CVEs, FTP+telnet exposed
HQAttackerVuln
185.217.0.0/24 ๐Ÿ”ด
.50 โ€” animalfreeporn.com (illegal content) ยท 5 CVEs
.150 โ€” hoka-official.ru (fake HOKA brand store) ยท 4 CVEs
.200 โ€” localmachineshops.com
Illegal ContentBrand Fraud
185.217.1.0/24
.133, .150 โ€” OpenVPN (1194) + Squid proxy (3128) + DNS
Tagged as vpn by Shodan
VPN FarmProxy
193.105.134.0/24
.150 โ€” Tor exit node (port 9001)
.100 โ€” Web + VMware (port 902)
.25 โ€” SSH only
TorVMware
91.236.116.0/24
.50 โ€” Windows SMB + MySQL (GreyNoise: MALICIOUS)
Sparse activity โ€” possible staging/reserve
MaliciousWindows

๐ŸŽฏ Primary Attacker: 185.246.128.133

MetricValue
Total Events23,938 (29 consecutive days)
Sessions1,444 SSH connections
Successful Logins1,399 (96.9% success rate)
Credential Usedadmin:admin โ€” single credential, 100% of attempts
SSH Client Strings55 different fingerprints โ€” rotated per session
Tunnel Requests5,596 direct-tcpip forwards
Commands Executed0 (pure tunneling, no shell interaction)
Malware Downloads0
First Seen2026-03-21 09:01 UTC
Last Seen2026-04-18 11:38 UTC (still active)
Exposed Ports135, 137, 139, 445, 5985 (SMB + WinRM = Windows server)
GreyNoiseNot in scanning database
MikroTik Statusโœ… Blocked โ€” mikrotik-attack list (entire /24)

๐Ÿ“Š Activity Pattern โ€” 29 Days

Consistent ~1,100 events/day with perfectly uniform 24-hour distribution โ€” no human sleep cycle, fully automated.

Mar 21
622
Mar 22
1,160
Mar 23
1,150
Mar 24โ€“31
~1,130/d
Apr 1
1,193
Apr 2โ€“5
34 โš™๏ธ
Apr 6โ€“11
~1,120/d
Apr 12โ€“13
445, 208
Apr 14โ€“18
~800/d

โš™๏ธ Apr 2-5 gap: operator maintenance / IP rotation / infrastructure change

๐Ÿ• Hourly Distribution (UTC) โ€” No Human Pattern

Activity is virtually flat across all 24 hours โ€” average 997 events/hour, standard deviation <60. This is machine-driven, not human-operated.

00โ€“03
~910/h
04โ€“07
~1,060/h
08โ€“11
~1,070/h
12โ€“15
~1,005/h
16โ€“19
~965/h
20โ€“23
~970/h

๐Ÿ”€ SSH Client Fingerprint Rotation โ€” 55 Unique Strings

The attacker cycles through 55 distinct SSH client strings per session to evade fingerprint-based detection. This is signature of commercial proxy validation software.

SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_5.3 (51 sessions)
SSH-2.0-paramiko_1.8.1 (47 sessions)
SSH-2.0-PuTTY_Release_0.63 (45 sessions)
SSH-2.0-PuTTY_Release_0.62 (43 sessions)
SSH-2.0-libssh_0.4.8 (33 sessions)
SSH-2.0-WinSCP_release_5.1.5 (32 sessions)
SSH-2.0-JSCH_0.1.51 (31 sessions)
SSH-2.0-Granados-1.0 (30 sessions)
SSH-2.0-Nmap_SSH2_Hostkey (20 sessions)
SSH-2.0-PuTTY_KiTTY (11 sessions)
... and 45 more variants (paramiko, libssh, WinSCP, CoreLab, PuTTY Snapshot)

๐Ÿš‡ Tunnel Analysis โ€” SSH Proxy Validation

After authenticating with admin:admin, the bot opens direct-tcpip SSH tunnels to test if the compromised host can be used as an HTTP proxy. All 5,596 tunnel requests target port 80 with identical HTTP/1.0 GET payloads.

$ direct-tcpip โ†’ 98.137.11.163:80
GET / HTTP/1.0\r\nHost: yahoo.com\r\n\r\n
$ direct-tcpip โ†’ 74.6.143.25:80
GET / HTTP/1.0\r\nHost: yahoo.com\r\n\r\n
$ direct-tcpip โ†’ 5.255.255.77:80
GET / HTTP/1.0\r\nHost: yandex.ru\r\n\r\n
$ direct-tcpip โ†’ 77.88.44.55:80
GET / HTTP/1.0\r\nHost: yandex.ru\r\n\r\n

๐ŸŽฏ Tunnel Destinations โ€” Proxy Validation Targets

Destination IPRequestsTargetPurpose
2001:4998:24:120d::1:0461Yahoo.com (IPv6)HTTP proxy test
2001:4998:124:1507::f000446Yahoo.com (IPv6)HTTP proxy test
2001:4998:44:3507::8001437Yahoo.com (IPv6)HTTP proxy test
98.137.11.163405Yahoo MailHTTP proxy test
74.6.143.25397Yahoo CDNHTTP proxy test
74.6.231.21387Yahoo CDNHTTP proxy test
5.255.255.77159Yandex.ruHTTP proxy test
77.88.44.55148Yandex DNS/WebHTTP proxy test
77.88.55.88147Yandex DNS/WebHTTP proxy test
๐Ÿ’ก Analysis: Yahoo and Yandex are used as validation targets because they're highly available and their responses confirm the proxy works. Validated proxies are then sold on underground markets for spam, credential stuffing, scraping, and anonymization. Our honeypot fakes the tunnel โ€” the attacker gets false positives, wasting their resources. ๐Ÿฏ

๐Ÿ”ด Criminal Activities Hosted on AS42237

ActivityEvidenceLocationSeverity
SSH Proxy Botnet24K events, 5,596 tunnels, 55 rotating SSH clients185.246.128.133โ— Critical
Credential StuffingBrute-force with admin:admin + 0:0, GreyNoise: MALICIOUS185.246.130.20โ— Critical
Counterfeit E-commercecrocs-diskont.ru โ€” fake brand discount store185.246.128.200โ— High
Counterfeit E-commercehoka-official.ru โ€” fake HOKA brand store185.217.0.150โ— High
Illegal Contentanimalfreeporn.com185.217.0.50โ— Critical
Tor Exit NodePort 9001, Shodan tag: tor193.105.134.150โ— High
VPN/Proxy FarmOpenVPN (1194) + Squid (3128), tagged vpn185.217.1.xโ— Medium
Vulnerable Infrastructure21 unpatched CVEs, FTP+telnet exposed185.246.130.133โ— High

๐Ÿ›ก๏ธ Our Defense Response

๐Ÿ”ฅ
MikroTik Firewall
Entire /24 blocked in mikrotik-attack address list. Static ban, no timeout.
๐Ÿฏ
Cowrie Honeypot
Captures all sessions. Fakes tunnel success โ†’ attacker wastes resources on dead proxies.
๐Ÿ“Š
Continuous Monitoring
Real-time ingestion via MCP tools. 23,938 events aggregated and analyzed in <1s.
๐Ÿง 
AI Correlation
Cross-referenced across CrowdSec, MikroTik, Falco, and Shodan for full threat picture.

๐Ÿ“‹ Final Assessment

Threat Classification: Organized Criminal Infrastructure

W1n LTD operates a bulletproof hosting network spanning 5 countries (UK registration, Ukrainian operator, Swedish hosting, Dutch abuse contact, Russian partner ASN). The infrastructure serves multiple criminal verticals simultaneously: proxy botnets for sale, counterfeit e-commerce fraud, illegal content hosting, and anonymization services.

The SSH proxy validation bot on 185.246.128.133 demonstrates commercial-grade tooling: 55 rotating SSH client fingerprints, perfectly uniform 24/7 operation, and Yahoo/Yandex as validation targets โ€” hallmarks of proxy-as-a-service infrastructure sold on underground markets.

The 4-day operational gap (Apr 2โ€“5) followed by continued activity suggests active operator maintenance, not abandoned infrastructure. This is a living, maintained criminal operation.

๐Ÿ“Ž Investigation Metadata

Investigation IDTI-2026-001
Date Conducted2026-04-18
Data SourcesCowrie honeypot logs (190MB), RIPE WHOIS, Shodan InternetDB, GreyNoise Community, RIPE Stat BGP, ThreatFox, URLhaus
Analysis ToolsLSN SOC Dashboard, 25 MCP Tools, custom Python aggregation
Monitoring Period2026-03-21 โ†’ 2026-04-18 (29 days)
Confidence LevelHIGH โ€” direct evidence from honeypot + multi-source OSINT corroboration
โš  Personal capacity. Research published independently โ€” not reflecting employer views. Derived from passive observation of attacks against personal infrastructure. Full disclaimer โ†’
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