LSN โ€” Local Sovereign Network

The Permanent Siege โ€” A Live Investigation Series
Letter A: The Proxy Verifier
86,239 Events from a Single IP in 94 Days
LIVE INVESTIGATION โ€” Attack in progress at time of publication
179.43.139.58 was actively flooding the honeypot during the writing of this dossier ยท June 22, 2026

๐Ÿ”„ The Proxy Verifier

At 23:15 local time on June 22, 2026, Telegram alerts fired. The honeypot was under sustained assault from a single IP address: 179.43.139.58. Over 30,000 events in 20 hours. Continuous. Relentless. Still active as this investigation was conducted.

This is not an unknown attacker. This IP was documented in TI-2026-037A "The Proxy Hunters" as part of the Omegatech/Private Layer scanner duo. It was identified as running industrial-scale credential harvesting with a libssh2_scanner fingerprint.

But 037A documented the scanning. This investigation documents what comes next: the proxy verification โ€” the quality control step where a compromised device is tested for its ability to relay traffic.

And the evidence shows this IP has been doing it for 94 consecutive days.

86,239
Total Events (94 Days)
112
Shodan Proxy Ports
3
Major Flood Cycles
30,134
Events Today (Still Rising)
admin:123456
Only Credential Used
0
Commands Executed

I. The Attacker โ€” Private Layer INC

RDAP Registration
IP179.43.139.58
Reverse DNShostedby.privatelayer.com
ASNAS51852 โ€” PLI-AS, PA
RegistrantPRIVATE LAYER INC
AddressSuite 1404, Floor 14, Torres De Las Americas, Torre C, Panama
Phone+41 43 5082295 (Switzerland)
Abuse Contactsupport@privatelayer.com
Network179.43.128.0/18 (16,384 IPs)
RegistryLACNIC (allocated 2013-11-12)
AbuseIPDBScore: 100/100 โ€” 900 reports
Usage TypeData Center / Web Hosting / Transit
HASSHa7a87fbe86774c2e (libssh2_scanner)

The jurisdictional architecture is deliberate: Panama registration (one of the hardest jurisdictions for cybercrime enforcement), Swiss phone number (banking secrecy tradition), LACNIC IP allocation (Latin American registry, different legal framework from RIPE/ARIN). The name itself โ€” "Private Layer" โ€” is a statement of intent.

112 Open Proxy Ports

Shodan reveals what this server actually is: a proxy concentrator with 112 open ports, spanning the range 10000-21935.

10000
10001
10014
10017
10023
10038
10106
10134
10146
10181
10209
10250
10554
10933
10934
11000
11002
11082
11110
11112
11210
11214
11371
11434
11560
11701
12016
12501
12509
12528
12541
12546
12549
12555
12563
12571
12582
12586
12615
13579
14084
14104
14147
14265
15001
15038
15042
15082
15151
15566
16009
16010
16011
16013
16014
16027
16051
16054
16066
16072
16077
16083
16094
16831
16841
16993
17082
17084
17777
17779
18001
18003
18009
18013
18018
18019
18024
18064
18067
18069
18071
18073
18081
18082
18245
18697
19013
19071
19082
19233
19483
20000
20018
20110
20256
20547
20600
20829
21025
21235
21236
21250
21259
21260
21279
21315
21329
21536
21567
21935
135
5985

Each port is a proxy endpoint. 112 ports on a single IP means this server is aggregating traffic from up to 112 simultaneous proxy customers or exit nodes. Port 135 (Windows RPC) and 5985 (WinRM) suggest additional attack surface beyond the proxy infrastructure.

Q: 112 open proxy ports visible on Shodan. Anyone can see this. Why hasn't the hosting provider taken action?
A: Because the hosting provider IS the operator. "Private Layer INC" is not a customer of some data center โ€” it IS the data center. The company name, the domain (privatelayer.com), the reverse DNS (hostedby.privatelayer.com) โ€” they own the infrastructure, the IPs, and the ASN. You cannot report abuse to the abuser. The abuse contact support@privatelayer.com is the same entity running the proxy network. This is the bulletproof hosting model perfected: be your own host, in a jurisdiction that doesn't care.

II. The Attack โ€” 94 Days of Proxy Verification

Private Layer has been probing our honeypot every single day since March 21, 2026. The pattern reveals a three-phase operational cycle:

Phase 1: Baseline Polling (86 days, avg 203 events/day)

Approximately 24 login attempts per hour, around the clock. Each session: connect โ†’ authenticate with admin:123456 โ†’ request SSH tunnel to Yahoo.com โ†’ receive rejection โ†’ disconnect โ†’ repeat in ~2.5 minutes. This is keepalive verification โ€” checking every few minutes that the "proxy" (our honeypot) is still responsive.

Phase 2: Escalation (5 days, avg 418 events/day)

Brief periods of increased activity, typically preceding or following a flood. The scanner increases its polling rate, possibly testing different forwarding configurations or cycling through Yahoo's DNS results.

Phase 3: Flood Verification (3 days, avg 22,225 events/day)

DateEventsSessionsTunnel RequestsPattern
March 296,0285481,096First bulk verification sweep
May 2330,5142,7745,548Major sweep โ€” 5x March volume
June 22 (TODAY)30,134+2,634+5,322+Active flood โ€” still in progress

The flood days are bulk re-verification sweeps. The operator is testing their entire proxy pool simultaneously โ€” connecting to each registered "proxy" IP in rapid succession, sending tunnel requests, and marking which ones respond. Our honeypot never responds to the forwarding request (Cowrie drops it), but the attacker keeps trying because they maintain it in their pool as a potential proxy.

III. The Verification Protocol

Every single one of the 86,239 sessions follows the same protocol:

Session Anatomy (Captured Live)

Step 1: TCP connection to port 2222 (honeypot SSH)

Step 2: SSH handshake with HASSH a7a87fbe86774c2e (libssh2_scanner)

Step 3: Authenticate: admin:123456 (success โ€” honeypot accepts it)

Step 4: Request direct-tcpip tunnel to a Yahoo.com IP on port 80

Step 5: Send through tunnel: GET / HTTP/1.0 Host: yahoo.com

Step 6: Wait for response. Cowrie discards the forwarding request. No response.

Step 7: Disconnect. Log result: proxy not functional.

Step 8: Repeat with next Yahoo IP from the rotation.

Why Yahoo.com?

The verification target is Yahoo.com โ€” specifically, all 12 of Yahoo's frontend IPs (6 IPv4, 6 IPv6):

IPTypeRequests TodayPurpose
98.137.11.163IPv4463Yahoo frontend
98.137.11.164IPv4449Yahoo frontend
74.6.143.25IPv4441Yahoo frontend
74.6.143.26IPv4449Yahoo frontend
74.6.231.20IPv4410Yahoo frontend
74.6.231.21IPv4449Yahoo frontend
2001:4998:24:120d::1:0IPv6474Yahoo frontend
2001:4998:24:120d::1:1IPv6420Yahoo frontend
2001:4998:124:1507::f000IPv6438Yahoo frontend
2001:4998:124:1507::f001IPv6458Yahoo frontend
2001:4998:44:3507::8000IPv6420Yahoo frontend
2001:4998:44:3507::8001IPv6451Yahoo frontend

Yahoo is the ideal verification target for three reasons:

  1. Availability: Yahoo.com has 99.99%+ uptime. If the tunnel fails, it's the proxy, not the target.
  2. Multiple IPs: 12 frontend IPs allow testing diverse routing paths through the proxy.
  3. HTTP/1.0: The GET / HTTP/1.0 request is the simplest possible HTTP transaction โ€” no TLS, no connection keep-alive, no cookies. A binary test: either the bytes come back or they don't.
Q: They're testing IPv6 forwarding too. That's unusual.
A: It reveals the sophistication of the proxy network. Most residential proxies are IPv4-only โ€” consumer routers typically don't have global IPv6 addresses. Testing IPv6 means Private Layer is also recruiting data center and cloud proxies (which do have IPv6) alongside residential ones. The 6 IPv4 + 6 IPv6 split in the verification targets suggests they're building a dual-stack proxy network โ€” valuable to customers who need to appear as specific IP types for web scraping, ad fraud, or credential stuffing operations.

IV. The Operational Pattern โ€” What the Timeline Reveals

The three flood events are not random. They occur at approximately 26-day intervals:

  • March 29: 6,028 events (first sweep โ€” initial pool verification)
  • May 23: 30,514 events (55 days later โ€” major pool expansion, 5ร— first sweep)
  • June 22: 30,134+ events (30 days later โ€” monthly re-verification, equal to May)

The 5ร— increase from March to May suggests the proxy pool grew by approximately 400% in two months. The stable volume between May and June suggests the pool has plateaued โ€” they're now maintaining rather than expanding.

Between floods, the baseline polling (~200 events/day, ~24 sessions/hour) is the operational heartbeat: checking every registered proxy every few minutes to ensure it's still alive. When one dies (router rebooted, IP changed, service blocked), it's removed from the pool. When the flood sweep finds a new working proxy, it's added.

The Economics of 112 Ports

With 112 open proxy ports and a verification sweep testing approximately 2,634 IPs per flood cycle, Private Layer's proxy network likely services 100+ concurrent customers. At residential proxy rates ($5-15/GB or $10-50/month per dedicated IP), a network of 2,634 verified proxies generates estimated revenue of $26,000-132,000/month.

The infrastructure cost: one server in Panama with a .com domain and a Swiss phone number.

V. Connection to the Ghost Machines Series

This investigation confirms and extends findings from the Ghost Machines series:

Finding037 Series038A (This Investigation)
IP identified179.43.139.58 as part of libssh2_scanner duoSame IP, now with 94-day operational timeline
Activity typeCredential harvesting (admin:admin)Proxy verification (admin:123456 + Yahoo tunneling)
Shodan ports"57+ proxy ports"112 ports (expanded since May investigation)
PartnerOmegatech LTD (AS202412, Seychelles)Omegatech not active today โ€” solo operation
Session volume7,950 total (DB snapshot)86,239+ (live data over 94 days)
Credentialadmin:admin (database)admin:123456 (live logs)
Q: The credential changed from admin:admin to admin:123456. Different operator?
A: Same HASSH fingerprint (a7a87fbe86774c2e), same IP, same libssh2 library. The credential change suggests either a configuration update or โ€” more likely โ€” a different mode of operation. The 037A data captured the scanning mode (trying admin:admin against unknown targets to find SSH servers). The 038A data captures the verification mode (using admin:123456, a common IoT factory default, against targets already identified as having this credential). Two different tools in the same pipeline, running on the same server.

VI. The Impact Assessment

Is the Honeypot Compromised?

No. Cowrie is a honeypot. It accepts all credentials but provides no real shell access. The direct-tcpip forwarding requests are logged and discarded โ€” they never leave the honeypot. The attacker has been sending 86,239 verification requests to a server that has never once forwarded a single byte. Every test fails. Every day, for 94 days, the test fails. And they keep trying.

Is the Server Vulnerable?

No. SSH on port 22 requires ed25519 key authentication. The honeypot runs on ports 2222-2230. There are no unauthorized SSH keys in ~/.ssh/authorized_keys. No suspicious crontabs. No unexpected outbound connections. The attack exists entirely within the honeypot's sandbox.

Why Does It Keep Trying?

Because the economics favor persistence. Checking one IP costs approximately 0.001 cents in bandwidth. If 1 in 1,000 checks reveals a working proxy worth $10/month, the return on investment is positive. The attacker has no incentive to stop probing a non-responsive IP โ€” the cost is negligible and the potential payoff justifies continued polling indefinitely.

"179.43.139.58 has been testing our honeypot's proxy capability every few minutes, 24 hours a day, for three months. It has never received a single successful tunnel response. It will try again tomorrow. And the day after. Because when the marginal cost of asking is zero, you never stop asking."

VII. What Comes Next

The Permanent Siege series continues with the other persistent attackers sharing our honeypot's bandwidth:

  • 038B: 185.246.128.133 โ€” w1n ltd (AS42237), the #2 attacker with 544 events today, still running the Paramiko malware delivery pipeline documented in 037C
  • 038C: The full port analysis โ€” what services are running behind Private Layer's 112 proxy ports, and who is buying them

TI-2026-038A ยท The Permanent Siege ยท Letter A
Published by LSN Threat Intelligence ยท Live investigation: June 22, 2026 23:15 EEST
86,239 events ยท 94 days ยท 112 proxy ports ยท 12 Yahoo verification targets
Attack was in progress during publication. Zero compromise. Zero vulnerability.
All data sourced from live Cowrie honeypot logs and open-source intelligence.

โš  Personal capacity. Research published independently โ€” not reflecting employer views. Derived from passive observation of attacks against personal infrastructure. Full disclaimer โ†’
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