๐ The Proxy Verifier
At 23:15 local time on June 22, 2026, Telegram alerts fired. The honeypot was under sustained assault from a single IP address: 179.43.139.58. Over 30,000 events in 20 hours. Continuous. Relentless. Still active as this investigation was conducted.
This is not an unknown attacker. This IP was documented in TI-2026-037A "The Proxy Hunters" as part of the Omegatech/Private Layer scanner duo. It was identified as running industrial-scale credential harvesting with a libssh2_scanner fingerprint.
But 037A documented the scanning. This investigation documents what comes next: the proxy verification โ the quality control step where a compromised device is tested for its ability to relay traffic.
And the evidence shows this IP has been doing it for 94 consecutive days.
I. The Attacker โ Private Layer INC
| IP | 179.43.139.58 |
| Reverse DNS | hostedby.privatelayer.com |
| ASN | AS51852 โ PLI-AS, PA |
| Registrant | PRIVATE LAYER INC |
| Address | Suite 1404, Floor 14, Torres De Las Americas, Torre C, Panama |
| Phone | +41 43 5082295 (Switzerland) |
| Abuse Contact | support@privatelayer.com |
| Network | 179.43.128.0/18 (16,384 IPs) |
| Registry | LACNIC (allocated 2013-11-12) |
| AbuseIPDB | Score: 100/100 โ 900 reports |
| Usage Type | Data Center / Web Hosting / Transit |
| HASSH | a7a87fbe86774c2e (libssh2_scanner) |
The jurisdictional architecture is deliberate: Panama registration (one of the hardest jurisdictions for cybercrime enforcement), Swiss phone number (banking secrecy tradition), LACNIC IP allocation (Latin American registry, different legal framework from RIPE/ARIN). The name itself โ "Private Layer" โ is a statement of intent.
112 Open Proxy Ports
Shodan reveals what this server actually is: a proxy concentrator with 112 open ports, spanning the range 10000-21935.
Each port is a proxy endpoint. 112 ports on a single IP means this server is aggregating traffic from up to 112 simultaneous proxy customers or exit nodes. Port 135 (Windows RPC) and 5985 (WinRM) suggest additional attack surface beyond the proxy infrastructure.
support@privatelayer.com is the same entity running the proxy network. This is the bulletproof hosting model perfected: be your own host, in a jurisdiction that doesn't care.II. The Attack โ 94 Days of Proxy Verification
Private Layer has been probing our honeypot every single day since March 21, 2026. The pattern reveals a three-phase operational cycle:
Phase 1: Baseline Polling (86 days, avg 203 events/day)
Approximately 24 login attempts per hour, around the clock. Each session: connect โ authenticate with admin:123456 โ request SSH tunnel to Yahoo.com โ receive rejection โ disconnect โ repeat in ~2.5 minutes. This is keepalive verification โ checking every few minutes that the "proxy" (our honeypot) is still responsive.
Phase 2: Escalation (5 days, avg 418 events/day)
Brief periods of increased activity, typically preceding or following a flood. The scanner increases its polling rate, possibly testing different forwarding configurations or cycling through Yahoo's DNS results.
Phase 3: Flood Verification (3 days, avg 22,225 events/day)
| Date | Events | Sessions | Tunnel Requests | Pattern |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| March 29 | 6,028 | 548 | 1,096 | First bulk verification sweep |
| May 23 | 30,514 | 2,774 | 5,548 | Major sweep โ 5x March volume |
| June 22 (TODAY) | 30,134+ | 2,634+ | 5,322+ | Active flood โ still in progress |
The flood days are bulk re-verification sweeps. The operator is testing their entire proxy pool simultaneously โ connecting to each registered "proxy" IP in rapid succession, sending tunnel requests, and marking which ones respond. Our honeypot never responds to the forwarding request (Cowrie drops it), but the attacker keeps trying because they maintain it in their pool as a potential proxy.
III. The Verification Protocol
Every single one of the 86,239 sessions follows the same protocol:
Step 1: TCP connection to port 2222 (honeypot SSH)
Step 2: SSH handshake with HASSH a7a87fbe86774c2e (libssh2_scanner)
Step 3: Authenticate: admin:123456 (success โ honeypot accepts it)
Step 4: Request direct-tcpip tunnel to a Yahoo.com IP on port 80
Step 5: Send through tunnel: GET / HTTP/1.0
Host: yahoo.com
Step 6: Wait for response. Cowrie discards the forwarding request. No response.
Step 7: Disconnect. Log result: proxy not functional.
Step 8: Repeat with next Yahoo IP from the rotation.
Why Yahoo.com?
The verification target is Yahoo.com โ specifically, all 12 of Yahoo's frontend IPs (6 IPv4, 6 IPv6):
| IP | Type | Requests Today | Purpose |
|---|---|---|---|
| 98.137.11.163 | IPv4 | 463 | Yahoo frontend |
| 98.137.11.164 | IPv4 | 449 | Yahoo frontend |
| 74.6.143.25 | IPv4 | 441 | Yahoo frontend |
| 74.6.143.26 | IPv4 | 449 | Yahoo frontend |
| 74.6.231.20 | IPv4 | 410 | Yahoo frontend |
| 74.6.231.21 | IPv4 | 449 | Yahoo frontend |
| 2001:4998:24:120d::1:0 | IPv6 | 474 | Yahoo frontend |
| 2001:4998:24:120d::1:1 | IPv6 | 420 | Yahoo frontend |
| 2001:4998:124:1507::f000 | IPv6 | 438 | Yahoo frontend |
| 2001:4998:124:1507::f001 | IPv6 | 458 | Yahoo frontend |
| 2001:4998:44:3507::8000 | IPv6 | 420 | Yahoo frontend |
| 2001:4998:44:3507::8001 | IPv6 | 451 | Yahoo frontend |
Yahoo is the ideal verification target for three reasons:
- Availability: Yahoo.com has 99.99%+ uptime. If the tunnel fails, it's the proxy, not the target.
- Multiple IPs: 12 frontend IPs allow testing diverse routing paths through the proxy.
- HTTP/1.0: The
GET / HTTP/1.0request is the simplest possible HTTP transaction โ no TLS, no connection keep-alive, no cookies. A binary test: either the bytes come back or they don't.
IV. The Operational Pattern โ What the Timeline Reveals
The three flood events are not random. They occur at approximately 26-day intervals:
- March 29: 6,028 events (first sweep โ initial pool verification)
- May 23: 30,514 events (55 days later โ major pool expansion, 5ร first sweep)
- June 22: 30,134+ events (30 days later โ monthly re-verification, equal to May)
The 5ร increase from March to May suggests the proxy pool grew by approximately 400% in two months. The stable volume between May and June suggests the pool has plateaued โ they're now maintaining rather than expanding.
Between floods, the baseline polling (~200 events/day, ~24 sessions/hour) is the operational heartbeat: checking every registered proxy every few minutes to ensure it's still alive. When one dies (router rebooted, IP changed, service blocked), it's removed from the pool. When the flood sweep finds a new working proxy, it's added.
With 112 open proxy ports and a verification sweep testing approximately 2,634 IPs per flood cycle, Private Layer's proxy network likely services 100+ concurrent customers. At residential proxy rates ($5-15/GB or $10-50/month per dedicated IP), a network of 2,634 verified proxies generates estimated revenue of $26,000-132,000/month.
The infrastructure cost: one server in Panama with a .com domain and a Swiss phone number.
V. Connection to the Ghost Machines Series
This investigation confirms and extends findings from the Ghost Machines series:
| Finding | 037 Series | 038A (This Investigation) |
|---|---|---|
| IP identified | 179.43.139.58 as part of libssh2_scanner duo | Same IP, now with 94-day operational timeline |
| Activity type | Credential harvesting (admin:admin) | Proxy verification (admin:123456 + Yahoo tunneling) |
| Shodan ports | "57+ proxy ports" | 112 ports (expanded since May investigation) |
| Partner | Omegatech LTD (AS202412, Seychelles) | Omegatech not active today โ solo operation |
| Session volume | 7,950 total (DB snapshot) | 86,239+ (live data over 94 days) |
| Credential | admin:admin (database) | admin:123456 (live logs) |
a7a87fbe86774c2e), same IP, same libssh2 library. The credential change suggests either a configuration update or โ more likely โ a different mode of operation. The 037A data captured the scanning mode (trying admin:admin against unknown targets to find SSH servers). The 038A data captures the verification mode (using admin:123456, a common IoT factory default, against targets already identified as having this credential). Two different tools in the same pipeline, running on the same server.VI. The Impact Assessment
Is the Honeypot Compromised?
No. Cowrie is a honeypot. It accepts all credentials but provides no real shell access. The direct-tcpip forwarding requests are logged and discarded โ they never leave the honeypot. The attacker has been sending 86,239 verification requests to a server that has never once forwarded a single byte. Every test fails. Every day, for 94 days, the test fails. And they keep trying.
Is the Server Vulnerable?
No. SSH on port 22 requires ed25519 key authentication. The honeypot runs on ports 2222-2230. There are no unauthorized SSH keys in ~/.ssh/authorized_keys. No suspicious crontabs. No unexpected outbound connections. The attack exists entirely within the honeypot's sandbox.
Why Does It Keep Trying?
Because the economics favor persistence. Checking one IP costs approximately 0.001 cents in bandwidth. If 1 in 1,000 checks reveals a working proxy worth $10/month, the return on investment is positive. The attacker has no incentive to stop probing a non-responsive IP โ the cost is negligible and the potential payoff justifies continued polling indefinitely.
"179.43.139.58 has been testing our honeypot's proxy capability every few minutes, 24 hours a day, for three months. It has never received a single successful tunnel response. It will try again tomorrow. And the day after. Because when the marginal cost of asking is zero, you never stop asking."
VII. What Comes Next
The Permanent Siege series continues with the other persistent attackers sharing our honeypot's bandwidth:
- 038B: 185.246.128.133 โ w1n ltd (AS42237), the #2 attacker with 544 events today, still running the Paramiko malware delivery pipeline documented in 037C
- 038C: The full port analysis โ what services are running behind Private Layer's 112 proxy ports, and who is buying them
TI-2026-038A ยท The Permanent Siege ยท Letter A
Published by LSN Threat Intelligence ยท Live investigation: June 22, 2026 23:15 EEST
86,239 events ยท 94 days ยท 112 proxy ports ยท 12 Yahoo verification targets
Attack was in progress during publication. Zero compromise. Zero vulnerability.
All data sourced from live Cowrie honeypot logs and open-source intelligence.