TI-2026-047E โ The First Ten Seconds
๐ The Short Version
- Letters AโD watched attackers knock. This one watches the door open.
- The front door is trivial: across 127,000 login attempts, the password
adminsucceeded 97.3% of the time it was sprayed;admin/adminlet in 285 different IPs. - The instant a login lands, a single pasted command runs 24 steps in ONE second. No human types that fast โ it's a script.
- The playbook is persistence-first: change root's password, create backdoor sudo users, then run the malware.
- It fetches two CPU architectures (x86 + ARM64) with two download tools โ built to infect everything.
- The payload, its server, and the victim are all on Google Cloud โ the same Meow operation whose web harvesting we mapped in Letters A and C. The kill chain closes.
We called it "the first ten seconds." The data is more brutal than that: it's the first one.
โฒ๏ธ Second Zero โ The Guess
Before anything elegant happens, something stupid works. The way in is almost never an exploit; it is a password somebody never changed.
Across the honeypot's window: 126,715 credential attempts, 30,700 unique combinations, an overall success rate of 15.5%. But "overall" hides how lopsided the winners are:
| Credential / spray | Scale | Success |
|---|---|---|
admin / admin | 285 IPs | 12,597 logins |
admin / 123456 | 77 IPs | 5,367 logins |
password = admin (sprayed) | 560 IPs ยท 102 usernames | 97.3% |
password = 123456 (sprayed) | 1,124 IPs | 69.2% |
root / (empty) | 698 IPs | 24,715 probes, 0 wins |
The empty-password root attempts are not break-ins โ they are reachability checks, a knock to see if anyone answers. The real wins come from a tiny dictionary of defaults.
345gs5662d34 (a notorious Mirai/IoT-bruteforcer canary) from 80 IPs, warnightkardesim (Turkish "warnight brother", the Warnight botnet) from 76, claude/claude from 106, and proxy-hunting socks/squid pairs. These aren't humans guessing โ they are named pieces of software spraying their built-in lists, and the lists betray which kit is on the wire.โฒ๏ธ Second One โ The Win
15.5% of the time, the knock opens the door. On this honeypot that is a logged, harmless event; on a real server it is the last quiet moment the owner will have. What happens next is the whole point of every scan in Letters A through D.
Consider one specimen: 35.196.255.242 โ Google Cloud (AS396982), threat score 75, abuse 100. It logged in as root / admin123. Then it stopped behaving like a visitor and started behaving like a program.
โฒ๏ธ Seconds TwoโThree โ The Paste
This is the actual transcript โ one command, pasted whole, that the honeypot recorded executing as 24 sub-commands between 03:38:48.43 and 03:38:48.45:
That IP ran 14 sessions and 72 commands in total; its Google-Cloud ASN neighbours (35.188.112.111, 34.123.134.194, 34.139.157.242โฆ) form a fleet doing the same thing.
๐ฌ Anatomy of the Paste
Decomposed, the one-liner is a complete, disciplined post-compromise routine:
- Stage & prep โ
cd /tmp(world-writable),ulimit -n 1020000(raise the open-file ceiling to a million โ classic flood/botnet preparation),rm -rf meow*(clear prior installs). - Fetch, twice โ
wgetandcurlfor each payload, so a host missing one tool still gets infected. - Two architectures โ
meow(x86) andmeowarm64(ARM64): one binary for cloud servers, one for routers, phones and IoT. - Execute โ
chmod 777then run both. - Persistence, immediately โ reset root's password to
modzmodz; create two sudo backdoor accountsadmin1anduser1(alsomodzmodz). - Plant a flag โ
echo -n root:admin123 > /tmp/mew, an ownership marker so the operation knows this box is already theirs.
It downloads the weapon, fires it, changes the locks, and signs the wall โ in less time than it takes to read this sentence's first word.
๐ง Reading Between the Lines
1. "Ten seconds" is generous โ and nobody is typing
Twenty-four commands, twenty milliseconds apart, is not a person. It is a clipboard. The implication for defenders is stark: there is no human-speed window to react. If the response is not automated, it does not exist โ because the attack already finished.
2. Persistence comes before profit
The routine secures the door before it uses the room โ root's password changed, two sudo backdoors created, before the miner has even reported home. The operator's first instinct is not to use the machine but to keep it, and to lock the rightful owner out. Remediation therefore cannot be "kill the bad process"; it must assume total account compromise.
3. Redundancy and dual-arch mean "infect everything"
Two fetch tools and two CPU architectures are not paranoia; they are market coverage. The same paste works on a Google VM, a Raspberry Pi and a home router. Breadth, not precision, is the design goal โ which is why no host is ever "too small to bother with."
4. The branding gives it a name
The string modz / modzmodz โ the new root password, the backdoor passwords โ recurs across the operation, and the binaries are literally named meow. It is a branded product, not a one-off. The signature is sloppy on purpose: at this volume, identity costs nothing and stealth buys little.
๐ฐ The Endgame โ Mining and Flooding
What the access is for shows up in the downloads. Across the honeypot: 210 downloads, 42 unique binaries, and a clear commodity-monetisation profile:
| Family | Type | IPs |
|---|---|---|
elf.redtail | Monero cryptominer | 10 |
elf.xmrig | Monero cryptominer | 5 |
elf.mirai / elf.aisuru | DDoS botnet (+ variant) | 3 |
elf.xorddos / win.havoc / win.remcos | DDoS / RAT | 3 |
One binary (SHA-256 a8460f44โฆ) appeared on 81 different IPs; another on 55 โ the same payload sprayed across the fleet from shared hosts (raw.githubusercontent.com, 31.170.22.205). Combined with the ulimit -n 1020000 flood-prep, the business model is plain: stolen compute (mining) and stolen bandwidth (DDoS). Any reachable host pays.
๐๏ธ Two Infrastructures โ Cheap Hands, Clean Delivery
The operation splits its supply chain exactly as the web side did in Letters BโD:
- The brute-force front end runs from bulletproof and abuse-tolerant networks โ
87.251.64.144/.145(ISAEV, KZ/PL, threat 100, GreyNoise malicious),37.77.150.223(Proton66, RU),176.65.139.103(STORMINDUSTRIES / Offshore LC, 685 combos),185.246.128.170(w1n ltd),136.0.251.107(SPARKED, malicious). Noisy, deniable, disposable. - The payload, C2 and victim sit on Google Cloud โ reputable, resilient, hard to block.
๐ The Kill Chain Closes
The two specimens at the heart of this dossier โ scanner 35.196.255.242 and payload host 35.237.91.38 โ are both Google Cloud, and both belong to the Meow operation documented in Letter 046E. The same operation's .env harvesting is what Letters A and C watched on the web surface.
So the series resolves into one continuous arc:
- 047A / 047C โ the web recon: hunt the
.env, harvest the credential. - 047E โ the SSH endgame: spray the credential, win the login, paste the playbook.
The credential the web side steals and the password the SSH side sprays feed the same one-second routine. The Glass Cage did not watch five separate threats. It watched one machine, from both sides of the wall.
โ The Questions
Who is this?
The Meow botnet โ a branded, automated SSH-propagating operation running end-to-end on Google Cloud, fed by bulletproof brute-force infrastructure.
Why did it attack?
Stolen compute and bandwidth: cryptomining (redtail, xmrig) and DDoS capacity (mirai, xorddos). Generic monetisation of any host it can keep.
Who does it claim to be?
Nobody โ and it doesn't care. It logs in as root, brands everything modz/meow, and leaves a marker file. Stealth is not the strategy; speed and scale are.
Whom is it related to?
Itself, on the web (047A/C, 046E) and across a Google-Cloud peer fleet; and the broader brute ecosystem (Warnight, the Mirai canary) by shared credential signatures.
Where is the money?
Monero wallets and DDoS-for-hire. The ulimit -n 1020000 is the tell โ this host is being prepped to flood.
What is the official anchor? [INST]
The payload rides Google Cloud (Alphabet); the brute layer rides ISAEV/Proton66/Offshore shells. Blue-chip delivery, bulletproof noise โ no single operator anchor, by design.
What if it is more than it appears?
The persistence-first routine (reset root, sudo backdoors) means the miner is the visible tenant, not necessarily the only one. A box kept this deliberately can be resold for access long after the obvious payload is found and killed.
โ๏ธ Verdict
Everything the earlier letters documented โ the harvested .env, the sprayed default, the catalogued scanner โ exists to buy the one second this dossier captures. In that second a pasted script downloads multi-architecture malware, executes it, resets the administrator's password, plants two backdoor accounts and signs the machine, then hands it to a miner.
There is no human in that second, and no time for one. The defensive lesson is not subtle: change the default credential so the door never opens, and automate the response so that if it does, something other than a person is watching โ because the attacker stopped relying on people a long time ago.
The whole siege, from the first scan to the planted backdoor, collapses into a single second of someone else's script running as root on a machine that used the password "admin".
๐ Related
- TI-2026-047A โ The Login Page That Watched Back ยท 047C โ The Botnet Census (the web recon that feeds this)
- TI-2026-046E โ The Cloud Mercenaries (the Meow operation on Google Cloud)
- TI-2026-040D โ The Turkish Connection (Warnight)
Series: ๐ช The Glass Cage ยท Letter: E ยท Classification: TLP:WHITE
Data sources: LSN SSH honeypot (Cowrie) โ credentials_intelligence, session cb009aee5541 transcript, downloads_intelligence ยท prior dossiers TI-2026-046E / 040D / 023B / 020B. External: CrowdStrike GTR 2024; Verizon DBIR 2024. Command transcript is external attacker activity captured in the honeypot (TLP:WHITE).
Investigation: TI-2026-047E ยท 6 actors ยท 8 evidence ยท 8 findings ยท 7 connections ยท 8 infrastructure records