LSN โ€” Local Sovereign Network

Executive Summary

This investigation deconstructs the naming layer of the Tor exit relay ecosystem that surrounds the Satanist network. Not the infrastructure โ€” the identities. The domains, relay nicknames, TLD choices, contact strings, and cultural signals that operators embed in their technical configurations.

We identify five distinct operators sharing the same hosting substrate (LAIN/AS211507, 1337 Services/AS210558), each with radically different naming conventions that reveal different threat models, different subcultural positions, and different relationships to anonymity.

The naming layer is not metadata noise. It is identity work โ€” operators writing themselves into the network.

5Distinct Operators
6Domains Analyzed
5TLD Jurisdictions
5Naming Grammars
1Real Name Found
3Identity Layers

1. The Naming as Intelligence

In conventional network analysis, relay nicknames and domain names are treated as arbitrary labels. You note them, you move on. The infrastructure matters; the words don't.

That is wrong here.

In this ecosystem, every naming choice is deliberate:

  • 2cb.li โ€” a Schedule I psychedelic drug, signaling transgressive subculture
  • allium.top โ€” the botanical genus of onions, a Tor-native pun
  • sy.st โ€” typographic compression of "system," a minimalist engineering identity
  • maxzrbn.it โ€” vowel-stripped real name, a semi-public technical persona
  • secretdrop.to โ€” a descriptive service brand, productized privacy
  • aluy.net / LAIN โ€” an anime about internet consciousness, the habitat's cultural substrate

These names form a coherent vocabulary. They share a cultural field: cypherpunk privacy, anime aesthetics, pseudonymous systems culture, and comfort with providers that mainstream operators avoid. But they are not the same operator.

2. The Five Operators

2.1 The Satanist (2cb.li) โ€” Transgressive Nihilism

๐Ÿ–ค Identity Profile

AttributeValue
Domain2cb.li โ†’ 2cb.su โ†’ 2cb.network (historical)
TLD Signal.li (Liechtenstein privacy), .su (Soviet transgression)
Relay Namesdead, death, demise, depression, desolate, die, dim, dismal, drear, dreary
Naming GrammarLowercase, single-word, death/desolation vocabulary
Contactadmin@2cb.su (anonymous)
DNS ProviderNymDNS (anonymous DNS service)
HostingNymBox (anonymous hosting, PTR: srv-6a4a58.mynymbox.io)
Identity PostureMaximum concealment through triple-layer anonymization

Assessment: This is identity through shock and opacity. The drug reference, the death lexicon, the Soviet TLD, the triple-anonymous infrastructure โ€” every layer says "I am unreachable and I don't care about your norms." The naming is performative menace.

2.2 sy.st โ€” Privacy Engineering Minimalism

โš™๏ธ Identity Profile

AttributeValue
Domainsy.st (renders as "Syst(em)")
TLD Signal.st (Sรฃo Tomรฉ) used as typographic hack: sy + .st = system
Relay NamesSyst (singular, functional)
Naming GrammarLiteral and functional: tor-01.sy.st
Contactem@sy.st, aliases "em" or "j3"
ServicesXMPP, DoH, Monero, Tor relays, I2P, blog
RegistrationGandi, 2017-11-24, registrant FR
Identity PostureLong-lived pseudonymous privacy homestead

Assessment: The opposite of 2cb.li. No shock, no performance, no subcultural menace. This is a privacy engineer's homestead โ€” running services because privacy matters, not because transgression is aesthetic. The domain name itself is an engineering joke: collapsing "system" into the minimum viable characters. Seven years of consistent operation (since 2017) suggests this is someone's life project, not a disposable identity.

2.3 maxzrbn.it โ€” The Semi-Public Engineer

๐ŸŽ“ Identity Profile

AttributeValue
Domainmaxzrbn.it (redirects to LinkedIn)
TLD Signal.it (Italy) โ€” personal/national identity declaration
Real NameMassimo Valerio Zerbini (confirmed via GitHub pdfauthor metadata)
AffiliationUniversity of Bologna, Computer Engineering (Ingegneria Informatica)
Relay Nameseden, utopia, mirage, reverie (aspirational/literary)
DNS Patternmoldova.exit.maxzrbn.it, iceland.exit.maxzrbn.it, etc.
Naming GrammarGeographic DNS locators + poetic relay nicknames
Contactmaxzrbn@protonmail.com, dns-familyid-ed25519 proof
Technical StackSLURM, Ansible, Vagrant (from thesis repos)
Identity PostureAccountable pseudonym with traceable real identity

Assessment: The only operator in this ecosystem whose real identity is publicly traceable. A young Italian systems engineer who runs Tor exits as part of a broader technical practice. The relay names (eden, utopia, mirage, reverie) are idealistic, almost literary โ€” the polar opposite of the Satanist's death vocabulary. His Ansible expertise is consistent with automated relay fleet management. This is not a criminal hiding; this is an engineer building.

2.4 allium.top โ€” Tor-Native Obfuscation

๐Ÿง… Identity Profile

AttributeValue
Domainallium.top (allium = onion genus)
TLD Signal.top (cheap, generic, pseudonymous-friendly)
RegistrarNjalla (privacy-first registrar, Iceland)
Relay NamesSieNCoAd, ASqUADeo, NgePTimE (opaque mixed-case)
Naming GrammarAnti-patterning: mixed-case strings resistant to linguistic analysis
Contacta78i2efsewr0neeknk@proton.me (disposable-style)
XMR Wallet82sdVXSFUJcici...VjtPbEk (DIFFERENT from Satanist's 85rXJTz...)
Bandwidth~668 Mbit/s across 3 exits
Identity PostureCategory declaration (Tor) + instance concealment (opaque labels)

Assessment: A deliberate split. The domain says "I am Tor infrastructure" (allium = onion). But the relay names say "you cannot pattern-match my nodes." The Njalla registration, the disposable ProtonMail address, the opaque nicknames โ€” this operator wants to be classified as Tor-native but not individually identifiable. The relay names resisted all cipher/anagram analysis: they appear to be stylized pseudorandom strings designed to be human-memorable but analytically opaque.

2.5 secretdrop.to โ€” The Privacy Product

๐Ÿ” Identity Profile

AttributeValue
Domainsecretdrop.to
TLD Signal.to (Tonga) โ€” clean anonymous branding for privacy services
ServiceOne-time encrypted secret/file sharing (AES-256-GCM, Argon2id)
Relay NamesSecretDropNL, SecretDropCH (descriptive: brand + country)
Naming GrammarService-descriptive: brand name + geographic suffix
Public PGPsecretdropto@protonmail.com
Relay Contactonion-express.aloha147@passinbox.com (compartmented)
FeaturesWarrant canary (BTC block hash, 2026-06-08), Tor onion mirror
Business ModelRelay sponsorship โ€” custom nickname selection by sponsors
Identity PostureThree-layer compartmentalization: brand / PGP / relay contact

Assessment: The most mature operational security in the cluster โ€” not because of concealment, but because of controlled compartmentalization. Three distinct identity layers, each serving a different audience. And uniquely, this operator productizes relay operation itself. The sponsorship model with custom nicknames means some relays in this ecosystem may be operated on behalf of unnamed third parties.

โš ๏ธ Attribution Implication: If SecretDrop offers managed relay operation with custom naming, then relay attribution becomes even more complex. A relay bearing a particular nickname may not be named by its operator โ€” it may be named by its sponsor. This adds a layer of indirection that traditional analysis doesn't account for.

3. The Naming Taxonomy

Across the broader Tor relay ecosystem, we observe four naming classes:

๐Ÿ“Š Relay Naming Classification

ClassPatternExample (this ecosystem)Example (wider Tor)Signal
Institutional/CivicOrganization + geographySecretDropNLCalyxInstitute, CCCBerlinAccountability, legitimacy
Personal-TechnicalHandle + functionaltor-01.sy.st, SystmyNiceRelay42Engineering ownership
Aesthetic/SymbolicLiterary, mythic, ideologicaleden, utopia, death, demiseZwiebelfreunde, TorServersNetIdentity and belonging
Anti-Pattern/OpaqueNoise, resistance to analysisSieNCoAd, ASqUADeo(uncommon)Anti-linkability

This ecosystem is unusual because it contains all four classes at once. That diversity supports the conclusion that LAIN/1337 space attracts multiple operator archetypes โ€” not one homogeneous cohort.

3.1 The TLD as Identity Declaration

๐ŸŒ TLD Semantics

TLDCountryOperator UseSignal
.li๐Ÿ‡ฑ๐Ÿ‡ฎ Liechtenstein2cb.liJurisdictional privacy styling
.suโ˜ญ Soviet Union2cb.suTransgressive political nostalgia
.st๐Ÿ‡ธ๐Ÿ‡น Sรฃo Tomรฉsy.stTypographic hack (sy+.st = system)
.it๐Ÿ‡ฎ๐Ÿ‡น Italymaxzrbn.itPersonal/national identity
.top๐ŸŒ Genericallium.topCheap pseudonymous infrastructure
.to๐Ÿ‡น๐Ÿ‡ด Tongasecretdrop.toClean anonymous branding
.net๐ŸŒ Genericaluy.net, 2cb.networkInfrastructure/commercial base

No two operators chose the same TLD strategy. Each TLD encodes a different relationship to identity disclosure โ€” from maxzrbn's honest .it to the Satanist's transgressive .su.

4. The Relay Name Duel: Death vs. Paradise

The most striking contrast in this ecosystem is between the Satanist's vocabulary and maxzrbn's:

โ˜ ๏ธ Satanist (2cb.li)

dead ยท death ยท demise ยท depression ยท desolate ยท die ยท dim ยท dismal ยท drear ยท dreary ยท dark

All begin with 'd'. All lowercase. All single-word. All death/bleakness. Template-friendly: variable = relay_names[i]

๐ŸŒฟ maxzrbn

eden ยท utopia ยท mirage ยท reverie

All lowercase. All single-word. All represent ideal/imagined places. Literary rather than nihilistic. Same structural pattern, opposite emotional valence.

Both operators use single-word, lowercase relay names. The structural grammar is identical. The semantic content is opposite. This is not accidental โ€” it reveals two fundamentally different relationships to the same infrastructure:

  • The Satanist uses naming as threat display โ€” "my infrastructure is dangerous, I am dangerous, look away"
  • maxzrbn uses naming as aspiration โ€” "my infrastructure serves ideal purposes, I am building toward something"

Same hosting ecosystem. Same technical practice. Different cosmology.

5. The Cipher Question: allium.top's Opaque Names

The allium.top relay names โ€” SieNCoAd, ASqUADeo, NgePTimE โ€” demand investigation. Are they encrypted? Encoded? Meaningful?

๐Ÿ” Analysis Attempted

MethodInputResult
Lowercasesiencoad, asquadeo, ngeptimeNo English words
Uppercase extractionSNCA, ASUAD, NPTENo known acronyms
Lowercase extractionieod, qeo, geimNo matches
Anagram (full)SIENCOAD โ†’ OCEANIDS? DIOCESE+AN?Partial matches, not conclusive
Even/odd positionVarious splitsNo clear lexemes
Base64/hex decodeN/ANot valid encodings

Assessment: The names are likely intentionally opaque โ€” designed to look human-chosen (CamelCase, pronounceable syllables) while resisting pattern analysis. The opacity is the message: "I am present in this network but I am not linkable by my labels." This contrasts sharply with every other operator who uses naming as communication.

๐Ÿงฉ Alternative Theory: The mixed-case pattern (SieNCoAd) could represent case-alternation as a visual fingerprint โ€” where the capitalization pattern itself is the identifier, recognizable to the operator but meaningless to observers. If so, it's a form of steganographic identity: the name contains information, but only for someone who knows the key.

6. The Habitat Model

The conventional question is: "Are these operators coordinated?" The evidence says: probably not directly, but they share a habitat.

Evidence for Independence

  • Different contact strings (5 distinct email patterns)
  • Different XMR wallets (at least 2 confirmed distinct)
  • Different relay naming grammars (5 distinct patterns)
  • Different domain semantics (drug, plant, system, name, service)
  • Different languages/locales (FR, IT, anonymous, anonymous, anonymous)
  • Different public service models (nihilist, engineer, student, obfuscator, product)

Evidence for Shared Habitat

  • Same ASNs (AS211507, AS210558)
  • Same provider class (LAIN, 1337 Services, BuyVM)
  • Same cultural references (Tor, anime, privacy, pseudonymity, Monero)
  • Same tolerance for abuse-sensitive infrastructure
  • Same technical practice (Tor exit relay operation)

The best model is not "one operator with many masks" nor "coordinated criminal network." It's a marketplace with a cultural filter. LAIN/aluy.net provides the infrastructure. The cultural vocabulary (anime, privacy, crypto) provides the social glue. Individual operators bring their own identities, threat models, and motivations.

This is how darknet ecosystems actually work: not as top-down organizations, but as scenes โ€” loose affiliations of independently motivated actors sharing resources, culture, and tolerance thresholds.

7. Cultural Decoding

The naming vocabulary maps to identifiable subcultures:

๐ŸŽญ Subcultural Map

SignalSubcultureOperatorRisk Implication
2C-B, SatanistPsychonaut / darknet drug culture2cb.liHigh comfort with illegal services
Death lexiconNihilist / industrial / black metal aesthetics2cb.liPerformative edge, unclear operational
Allium, onionTor-native technical communityallium.topPrivacy-focused, not necessarily criminal
LAIN, animeCyberpunk anime / internet-consciousnessaluy.net/LAINCultural belonging, youth-oriented
Syst(em)Unix/hacker systems culturesy.stEngineering ideology, privacy as principle
Eden, utopiaIdealistic/literary tech culturemaxzrbnLow-threat, values-driven
SecretDropPrivacy products / whistleblower toolssecretdrop.toProductized, semi-legitimate
.su (Soviet)Post-Soviet internet nostalgia / edgelord2cb.suDeliberately provocative
AokigaharaJapanese death aesthetics / suicide forestKyun SRL/Aokigahara SRLMorbid branding, zero-KYC hosting

The intersection point is clear: technically literate, privacy-maximalist, irony-tolerant, and comfortable with providers that mainstream operators would avoid. This is not one subculture โ€” it's the overlap zone of several. And that overlap zone is exactly where bulletproof hosting thrives.

8. What Naming Reveals That Infrastructure Doesn't

ASN analysis tells us operators are co-located. Naming analysis tells us why they chose this location and what they think they're doing:

  • The Satanist chose LAIN because it tolerates his aesthetic and doesn't require identity
  • sy.st chose LAIN because it offers privacy-respecting infrastructure for genuine privacy services
  • maxzrbn chose 1337 Services because it's cheap, Tor-friendly, and technically adequate
  • allium.top chose multiple providers (LAIN, BuyVM, Aha-IT) for redundancy โ€” the naming says nothing about motivation, only about discipline
  • secretdrop.to chose LAIN because it supports the relay-sponsorship business model without asking questions

The infrastructure question is "where?" The naming question is "who?"

๐Ÿ”‘ Investigative Principle: In anonymity-first ecosystems where traditional attribution fails, the naming layer becomes the primary identity signal. Operators who obsessively anonymize their infrastructure still choose their own names. Those choices are self-portraits.

9. Conclusions

  • Five distinct operators share LAIN/1337 Services infrastructure, confirmed by independent contact strings, wallets, naming conventions, and public identities
  • Naming conventions are diagnostic: they predict operator type, threat model, and subcultural affiliation more reliably than IP addresses or ASN membership
  • The ecosystem is a habitat, not a hierarchy โ€” operators self-select into the same space because of shared cultural markers and tolerance thresholds
  • One operator (maxzrbn) is publicly identifiable; the others range from semi-anonymous to fully anonymous
  • SecretDrop's sponsorship model introduces relay-as-a-service, meaning some nodes may be named by sponsors rather than operators โ€” a new layer of attribution complexity
  • The cultural vocabulary (drugs, death, anime, systems, secrets) is not decorative noise โ€” it's the social protocol that holds this ecosystem together
Methodology Note: This investigation combined WHOIS/DNS analysis, GitHub OSINT, Wayback Machine archives, Onionoo relay data, certificate transparency logs, web content analysis, cryptographic comparison (XMR wallets, PGP keys), anagram/cipher testing on relay names, and cross-referencing across 30+ prior investigations. Attribution confidence levels: maxzrbn = HIGH (real name confirmed), sy.st = MEDIUM (persistent pseudonym, 7yr history), allium.top = LOW (fully compartmented), secretdrop.to = LOW (three-layer identity), 2cb.li = LOW (triple-anonymous infrastructure). The conclusion "five separate operators" rests on the cumulative weight of independent evidence, not any single signal.
โš  Personal capacity. Research published independently โ€” not reflecting employer views. Derived from passive observation of attacks against personal infrastructure. Full disclaimer โ†’
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