LSN โ€” Local Sovereign Network

๐Ÿ”ด ACTIVE โ€” Outlaw/mdrfckr Cryptomining Botnet ยท 1,639 Compromised Hosts ยท 84+ Countries ยท 456+ ASNs ยท 45+ Days ยท Still Running

TI-2026-012 โ€” "The mdrfckr Botnet" โ€” 1,639 IPs, 84+ Countries, One SSH Key, One Operator

The Outlaw hacking group's flagship SSH credential-spraying campaign, active since 2018 and still running as of May 2026. A single RSA public key with the comment mdrfckr is planted on every victim. The botnet uses libssh (versions 0.11.1 and 0.12.0) to brute-force weak SSH passwords across cloud VPS, game servers, business ERP systems, and residential IoT โ€” then profiles CPU/RAM/disk to score targets for XMRig Monero mining. Our honeypot captured 51,960 login sessions from 1,639 unique IPs across 456+ autonomous systems in 84+ countries over a 45+ day window (2026-03-28 โ†’ ongoing). On April 21, the operator silently upgraded the SSH library, rotating the HASSH fingerprint โ€” any detection system tracking only the old fingerprint would see a dying campaign while the botnet was actually growing. This dossier maps the full infrastructure: ByteDance's cloud platform is the #1 corporate contributor (~90 IPs), a Spamhaus-listed bulletproof hoster in Seychelles provides persistent nodes, and compromised Korean home routers and Starlink terminals serve as residential relay points. The credential dictionary carries unmistakable Chinese cultural fingerprints โ€” QQ references, lucky number 888, the 520 love code โ€” maintained by an operator active for 4+ years.
๐Ÿฆ  Outlaw / mdrfckr Malware SSH-2.0-libssh_0.11.1 1,639 Unique IPs (two waves) 456 ASNs ยท 84 Countries ByteDance #1 Infrastructure Spamhaus-Listed BPH (Cloudie) Chinese-Origin Dictionary Bot-on-Bot Poaching Active Campaign ยท 6+ Years Running

๐Ÿ“‹ Executive Summary

Between 2026-03-28 and 2026-05-12 (and still running as this dossier is published), a single Cowrie SSH honeypot captured the largest coordinated attack campaign in its history: 51,960 login sessions from 1,639 unique IPs across 456+ autonomous systems in 84+ countries. The campaign operates in two waves: the initial wave used HASSH fingerprint 03a80b21afa8โ€ฆ (SSH-2.0-libssh_0.11.1, 1,288 IPs), and on April 21 the operator silently upgraded to af8223ac9914โ€ฆ (SSH-2.0-libssh_0.12.0, 537 IPs), with 186 IPs confirmed to have switched between fingerprints. This is the Outlaw hacking group's mdrfckr botnet, first documented by Trend Micro in 2018, and the exact same RSA backdoor key has been in continuous use for six years.

The botnet's infrastructure spans three tiers: ~64% commercial cloud VPS (ByteDance, UCloud, DigitalOcean, Azure, Tencent, Oracle), ~14% compromised residential endpoints (Korean home routers, Starlink terminals, Mexican DSL), and ~3% deliberate bulletproof hosting (KoDDoS in Seychelles, Cloudie Limited on Spamhaus ASN-DROP). A critical finding: ByteDance's Volcano Engine and BytePlus platforms contribute approximately 90 IPs โ€” the largest single corporate infrastructure owner โ€” after correcting a geolocation database error that mislabeled their 14.103.0.0/16 block as China Telecom. The credential dictionary carries unmistakable Chinese cultural signatures (888 lucky numbers, QQ references, 520 love code, Pinyin keyboard patterns) and targets specific application service accounts (GitLab CI runners, Elasticsearch, n8n automation, Frappe ERPNext, Project Zomboid game servers, Huawei network equipment). One credential โ€” 345gs5662d34:345gs5662d34 โ€” is a confirmed botnet propagation marker: the bots are hunting machines already infected by other bots.

This dossier reproduces what the public registries return for every ASN, every BGP prefix, every abuse contact. We are not judges. We are the providers of what the records say and what the honeypot caught.

๐Ÿฏ Honeypot Collection โ€” 45+ days, ongoing
1,639
Unique Attacker IPs
51,960
Login Sessions
456
Autonomous Systems
84
Countries
6+
Years Active (since 2018)

The Outlaw hacking group was first documented by Trend Micro in October 2018. The name "Outlaw" derives from Haiduc, Romanian for "social outlaw" or "brigand," after their primary SSH brute-force tool. The group is believed to be Romanian-speaking based on strings in their tooling, though the credential dictionary in this campaign carries strong Chinese cultural signatures โ€” suggesting either a Chinese affiliate operating the same toolset, or a handoff of infrastructure.

Tool Lineage โ€” 6 Years of Evolution
HAIDUC (SSH brute-force, C language, ~2018)
  โ”‚
  โ”œโ”€โ”€ Initial access: brute-forces weak SSH credentials
  โ”‚
  โ””โ”€โ”€ Delivers payload bundle:
       โ”‚
       โ”œโ”€โ”€ ShellBot (Perl IRC bot, C2 via port 6667)
       โ”‚     โ””โ”€โ”€ DDoS, lateral movement, command execution
       โ”‚
       โ”œโ”€โ”€ mdrfckr RSA key injection โ† THE PERSISTENT BACKDOOR
       โ”‚     โ””โ”€โ”€ Same key reused for 6+ years
       โ”‚     โ””โ”€โ”€ Survives password changes
       โ”‚
       โ”œโ”€โ”€ XMRig / Monero miner
       โ”‚     โ””โ”€โ”€ Pool-based, operator-controlled
       โ”‚
       โ””โ”€โ”€ Hardware fingerprinter (post-2025 addition)
             โ””โ”€โ”€ 15-command probe: CPU, RAM, disk, arch
             โ””โ”€โ”€ Scores targets before deploying miner

The toolset has evolved significantly since 2018: the SSH scanner migrated from Haiduc (C) to libssh-based scanners (faster, portable, supports modern KEX algorithms). The Perl IRC bot has been augmented with other C2 mechanisms. A hardware fingerprinting phase was added to score targets before payload delivery. But the mdrfckr RSA key โ€” the operator's long-term persistence backdoor โ€” has been continuously reused across all evolutions for six years. cPanel's production security tool (CSI) explicitly detects it.

0 ยท SPRAY
Mass credential brute-force via libssh_0.11.1
Three-step credential protocol per target:
1. 345gs5662d34:345gs5662d34 โ€” Fail (probe for already-compromised hosts)
2. root:3245gs5662d34 โ€” Success, 0 commands (connectivity check)
3. root:<variable> โ€” Success โ†’ payload delivery
1 ยท PERSIST
Strip .ssh immutable flags โ†’ wipe โ†’ inject backdoor key
cd ~; chattr -ia .ssh; lockr -ia .ssh
cd ~ && rm -rf .ssh && mkdir .ssh && echo "ssh-rsa AAAA...== mdrfckr" >> .ssh/authorized_keys
chmod -R go= ~/.ssh
2 ยท EVICT
Terminate rival botnets โ€” the Outlaw family signature
rm -rf /tmp/secure.sh; rm -rf /tmp/auth.sh; echo > /etc/hosts.deny
3 ยท PROFILE
15-command hardware fingerprint โ€” decides if target is worth mining
cpuinfo | grep name | wc -l ยท free -m ยท df -h ยท uname -a ยท uname -m ยท lscpu | grep Model ยท ls -lh $(which ls) ยท w ยท top ยท whoami ยท crontab -l
โš ๏ธ The 345gs5662d34 "radioactive dye"

The credential 345gs5662d34:345gs5662d34 is a botnet propagation marker โ€” a password the mdrfckr campaign sets on machines it compromises so the operator can return later. Other nodes in the same campaign recognize the brand and skip re-exploitation. Independent honeypots (HK, UK, USA, Australia) report 2,300+ hits each. As one researcher put it: "The bots have become self-referential. They are brute-forcing the passwords that other bots set." Bot-on-bot poaching โ€” Botnet B stealing Botnet A's fleet โ€” is confirmed behavior.

IndicatorValue
RSA pubkey commentmdrfckr
Pubkey blob prefixAAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAABJQAAAQEArDp4cun2lhr4KUhBGE7Vv
RSA exponent0x25 (37) โ€” non-standard; ssh-keygen defaults to 65537
Key SHA-256a8460f446be540410004b1a8db4083773fa46f7fe76fa84219c93daa1669f8f2
Primary HASSH03a80b21afa810682a776a7d42e5e6fb โ†’ SSH-2.0-libssh_0.11.1 (1,286 IPs)
Secondary HASSHaf8223ac9914f509afdadfaf5f7ee94e โ†’ SSH-2.0-libssh_0.12.0 (185 IPs, newer wave)
Propagation credential345gs5662d34:345gs5662d34 (and variant 3245gs5662d34)
Cleanup signaturerm -rf /tmp/secure.sh auth.sh; echo > /etc/hosts.deny
Toolkit binary markerlockr โ€” non-standard chattr equivalent
โšก One-line check for any Linux host
grep -rF 'mdrfckr' /root/.ssh /home/*/.ssh /etc/ssh 2>/dev/null && echo "โš ๏ธ COMPROMISED" || echo "โœ… Clean"

The botnet uses a fixed credential dictionary synchronized across 34โ€“40 IPs โ€” the same passwords appear identically across all scanners, indicating central C2 distribution. The dictionary carries unmistakable Chinese-origin signals with secondary English-language aggregation:

๐Ÿ‡จ๐Ÿ‡ณ Chinese Cultural Signals
Root888.. โ€” 888 (ๅ…ซๅ…ซๅ…ซ) = ultra-lucky triple in Chinese culture
BBqq000 โ€” QQ (่…พ่ฎฏQQ) = China's dominant IM platform
5202414cc โ€” 520 = "ๆˆ‘็ˆฑไฝ " (I love you) in Chinese numeric netspeak
fjbdfdjkdsfs541544@@ โ€” structured numeric tail, not random mashing
1234asd, a.123456 โ€” Pinyin keyboard muscle memory patterns
๐ŸŽฏ Target-Specific Credentials
ubuntu:Password01 โ€” AWS/Azure/GCP Ubuntu VMs (40 IPs, most common)
elasticsearch:elasticsearch@1234 โ€” ELK stacks
gitlab-runner:123456 โ€” GitLab CI/CD runners
n8n:N8n31 โ€” n8n workflow automation
deploy:Frappe โ€” Frappe/ERPNext business ERP
pzuser:12345 โ€” Project Zomboid game servers
root:Admin@huawei โ€” Huawei network equipment
๐Ÿ“… Dictionary Evolution โ€” 4+ Year Maintenance Window
2022 โ†’ ZAQ!2wsx2022! โ€” earliest year-tagged entry (keyboard walk)
2024 โ†’ node2024 โ€” mid-period update
2025 โ†’ Mexico2025, steam2025!@#, Gd@ta2025 โ€” major refresh
2026 โ†’ Master@2026, abcd2026 โ€” current year, actively maintained

Old passwords like ZAQ!2wsx2022! are deliberately retained โ€” many servers set a password once and never change it. The operator knows a 2022 password may still be running in 2026.

๐Ÿ” Complexity Rule Bypass โ€” Deliberate Engineering

Many passwords are engineered to satisfy enterprise complexity rules (uppercase + lowercase + number + special, 8+ chars): Zz123456. is the laziest possible password that passes NIST-derived policies. P@ssw0rd1234, Root888.., Master@2026 all satisfy four-class complexity. The dictionary also includes naive passwords (admin1234, jjjjjjjj) for unprotected servers. The operator has studied password policy requirements and designed for maximum coverage.

๐Ÿ“Š Full Credential Dictionary โ€” 60 entries, sorted by IP coverage โ–ธ
UsernamePasswordIPsNotes
ubuntuPassword0140AWS/Azure/GCP Ubuntu VMs โ€” #1 most common
rootfjbdfdjkdsfs541544@@38Structured numeric tail โ€” not random
gitlab-runner12345637GitLab CI/CD runners
rootMaster@202637Year-aware, complexity-compliant
rootZz123456.37Minimum viable complexity password
rootadmin123437Generic
elasticsearchelasticsearch@123436ELK stack targeting
n8nN8n3136n8n workflow automation
rootRoot888..36๐Ÿ‡จ๐Ÿ‡ณ 888 = lucky number
rootBBqq00036๐Ÿ‡จ๐Ÿ‡ณ QQ messenger reference
rootnE7jA%5m36Randomly generated
deployFrappe35Frappe/ERPNext ERP systems
pzuser1234535Project Zomboid game servers
userUser05!35Generic with complexity
345gs5662d34345gs5662d3434๐Ÿฆ  Botnet propagation marker
rooroot34๐Ÿ› Buggy-worm-created account
steamSteam1234533Steam game servers
ftpuserjjjjjjjj32FTP servers โ€” braindead default
rootAdmin@huawei19Huawei network equipment default
root5202414cc18๐Ÿ‡จ๐Ÿ‡ณ 520 = "I love you" netspeak
~64%
Commercial Cloud VPS
ByteDance, UCloud, Azure, DigitalOcean, Tencent, Oracle, Baidu, OVH, IONOS, Contabo
~14%
Compromised Residential
Korea Telecom, SK Broadband, HiNet Taiwan, Telmex Mexico, Starlink, CHINANET
~3%
Bulletproof Hosting
KoDDoS/Amarutu (Seychelles), Cloudie Ltd (Spamhaus DROP), PatrikWeb/Connect2IP (Sweden/Malta)
โš ๏ธ Critical Attribution Correction

The IP block 14.103.0.0/16 (39 IPs in 3 adjacent /21 blocks) is not China Telecom. APNIC RDAP confirms it was reassigned to Beijing Volcano Engine Technology Co., Ltd. (ByteDance) in May 2022. Abuse contact: gnoc@bytedance.com. MaxMind, ip2location, and most geolocation databases still show stale China Telecom attribution โ€” a common lag problem with portable IP block reassignments.

ByteDance EntityASNIPs in BotnetAbuse Contact
Volcano Engine (other blocks)AS13771826gnoc@bytedance.com
Volcano Engine (14.103.0.0/16, misattributed)AS4811 (stale)39gnoc@bytedance.com
BytePlus (Singapore)AS15043625bd_abuse@bytedance.com
Total ByteDance ecosystem~90#1 single corporate infrastructure owner

Volcano Engine (็ซๅฑฑๅผ•ๆ“Ž) is ByteDance's domestic Chinese cloud platform โ€” originally built to run TikTok/Douyin's backend, opened to external customers in 2021. BytePlus is ByteDance's international cloud brand, headquartered at 1 Raffles Quay, Singapore. Both are public cloud providers where anyone can rent VPS instances. The botnet operators are paying cloud customers, not ByteDance employees. But ByteDance's abuse response pipeline (gnoc@bytedance.com) is less battle-tested than AWS or Azure โ€” a single abuse report covering ~90 IPs could significantly reduce botnet size.

๐Ÿ”ด Cloudie Limited (AS55933) โ€” SPAMHAUS ASN-DROP
Hong Kong entity: Unit 1604, Perfect Industrial Building, San Po Kong, Kowloon. 9 separate ASNs linked to cloudie.hk on the Spamhaus ASN-DROP list โ€” as one ASN gets blocklisted, new ones are acquired under different company names. 220,928 IPv4 addresses. Route to AS6939 (Hurricane Electric). 8 botnet IPs.
๐ŸŸ  KoDDoS / Amarutu Technology (AS206264) โ€” Seychelles
Paper address: Level 23, One Island East, Hong Kong. Actual operations: Seychelles (+248 phone). Abuse: abuse@koddos.com. Markets "DDoS protection 10โ€“350 Gbps" โ€” a known cover for bulletproof hosting. 321 BGP peers including NTT, Cogent, GTT (Tier-1 carriers). 15,872 IPv4 addresses. ~20 botnet IPs.
๐ŸŸก PatrikWeb / Connect2IP (AS35100) โ€” Sweden/Malta Offshore Structure
ASN owner: Patrik Lagerman, Vilhelmsrogatan 83, Vaxjo, Sweden. Admin/tech: Connect2IP Operation LTD, Bisazza Street, Sliema, Malta โ€” offshore shell with Swedish phone numbers. Prefix 171.25.152.0/21 ("KRONNET") hosts IRC servers, bulk adult dating domains, spam nameservers. Zero RPKI coverage across all 11 prefixes โ€” no route origin validation at all. 7 botnet IPs.
Top 15 Countries by IP Count
๐Ÿ‡จ๐Ÿ‡ณ China21716.8%
๐Ÿ‡บ๐Ÿ‡ธ United States18214.1%
๐Ÿ‡ญ๐Ÿ‡ฐ Hong Kong917.1%
๐Ÿ‡ฎ๐Ÿ‡ฉ Indonesia826.4%
๐Ÿ‡ธ๐Ÿ‡ฌ Singapore705.4%
๐Ÿ‡ฐ๐Ÿ‡ท South Korea574.4%
๐Ÿ‡ป๐Ÿ‡ณ Vietnam453.5%
๐Ÿ‡ง๐Ÿ‡ท Brazil433.3%
๐Ÿ‡ฎ๐Ÿ‡ณ India413.2%
๐Ÿ‡ท๐Ÿ‡บ Russia352.7%
๐Ÿ‡ฉ๐Ÿ‡ช Germany352.7%
๐Ÿ‡ฌ๐Ÿ‡ง United Kingdom322.5%
๐Ÿ‡ธ๐Ÿ‡จ Seychelles251.9%
๐Ÿ‡ง๐Ÿ‡ฉ Bangladesh221.7%
๐Ÿ‡ฒ๐Ÿ‡ฝ Mexico181.4%
Top 15 ASNs by IP Count
AS135377UCloud HK73
AS4811China Telecom Shanghai*64
AS8075Microsoft Azure56
AS136052PT Cloud Indonesia46
AS14061DigitalOcean38
AS132203Tencent Cloud35
AS4766Korea Telecom ๐Ÿ 32
AS4134CHINANET Backbone29
AS137718Volcano Engine (ByteDance)26
AS150436BytePlus (ByteDance)25
AS38365Baidu Cloud22
AS8560IONOS (+ legacy ProfitBricks)29
AS9318SK Broadband Korea ๐Ÿ 14
AS31898Oracle Cloud14
AS396982Google Cloud13

* AS4811 includes 39 IPs actually belonging to Volcano Engine (see correction above). ๐Ÿ  = residential ISP.

๐Ÿ“ก Compromised Residential Endpoints โ€” IoT / Home Devices

The Korean residential cluster (46 IPs) across Korea Telecom and SK Broadband is striking โ€” these are home NAS devices, routers, and IoT running persistent SSH with weak credentials, never patched. HiNet Taiwan (9 IPs) shows .dynamic-ip.hinet.net rDNS โ€” ADSL/fiber home connections. Telmex Mexico (10 IPs) โ€” home DSL. And 4 Starlink terminals โ€” geographically dispersed, physically remote, 24/7 operation with minimal monitoring. These aren't rented VPS โ€” they are compromised home devices repurposed as botnet scanners.

ProviderRed FlagDetails
YISU Cloud (AS138152/142403)Invalid abuse contactlph@yisu.com marked as "INVALID" by APNIC (March 2026). Guangzhou mainland entity behind HK shell. 3 ASNs.
Multilink International (AS142627)Invalid abuse contactislam@multilinkisp.com marked "INVALID" by APNIC. Tiny Dhaka ISP (512 IPs). 8 compromised endpoints.
PatrikWeb (AS35100)Zero RPKI, Malta shell0/11 prefixes RPKI-valid. Malta offshore company (Connect2IP) as admin. IRC servers, spam domains.
Cloudie Limited (AS55933)Spamhaus ASN-DROP9 ASNs under cloudie.hk โ€” as one gets blocked, new ones acquired. BPH by definition.
PT Cloud + Cloud HostCross-peering, same owner?Direct BGP peering, similar infection rates (0.2%), likely same operator group.

Shodan InternetDB data for 844 of the 1,288 IPs reveals the software stack of compromised hosts โ€” these are the victims, not the attacker's infrastructure:

Operating Systems
Ubuntu Linux โ€” 370 IPs (43.8%)
Linux kernel (generic) โ€” 181 IPs
Debian Linux โ€” 92 IPs
CentOS โ€” 15 IPs
Top Open Ports
Port 22 (SSH) โ€” 508 IPs
Port 80 (HTTP) โ€” 263 IPs
Port 443 (HTTPS) โ€” 186 IPs
Port 3306 (MySQL) โ€” 57 IPs
Port 8080 (HTTP-alt) โ€” 50 IPs
Shodan Tags โ€” What These Hosts Look Like
eol-product โ€” 165 IPs running end-of-life software ยท self-signed โ€” 102 IPs with self-signed TLS ยท cloud โ€” 88 IPs ยท database โ€” 82 IPs with exposed databases ยท scanner โ€” 38 IPs flagged as scanners themselves ยท vpn โ€” 35 IPs

165 hosts running end-of-life software and 82 with exposed databases โ€” these victims were low-hanging fruit before the botnet ever reached them.

Daily Attack Volume โ€” March 28 โ†’ May 12, 2026
Mar 28Apr 3 โ˜…Apr 11 โ˜…Apr 20May 1May 12 ๐ŸŸข
Peak: 2,557 attempts on April 3 from 102 IPs. Peak successes: 10 on April 11. Campaign shows classic decay curve โ€” initial burst (155 active IPs on Mar 31), gradual decline to steady state (~10-20 IPs/day), still running.
AttributionOutlaw hacking group (Trend Micro designation, 2018)
Operator originChinese-speaking (high confidence) โ€” cultural signals in credential dictionary: 888 lucky numbers, QQ references, 520 love code, Pinyin keyboard patterns. Romanian tooling lineage (Haiduc) suggests possible Chinese affiliate operating Romanian-origin toolset.
SophisticationMedium-High โ€” curated multi-vintage dictionary, complexity-aware password engineering, hardware fingerprinting for target scoring, bot-on-bot poaching, multi-tier infrastructure
Active since2018 (6+ years) โ€” same RSA key in continuous use. Dictionary refreshed with year-tagged passwords: 2022, 2024, 2025, 2026.
Primary objectiveMonero (XMR) cryptomining โ€” XMRig deployment on scored targets
Secondary objectivesBot fleet expansion (SSH key persistence), data exfiltration from ERP/DevOps targets, fleet poaching from rival botnets
Infrastructure preferenceStrong preference for Asian cloud providers (ByteDance, UCloud, Tencent, Baidu) โ€” suggests Chinese payment methods (Alipay, WeChat Pay) and familiarity with Chinese cloud consoles. Minimal use of bulletproof hosting (~3%) โ€” relies on volume and cloud provider abuse-response lag instead.
#TargetContactEst. IPsExpected Response
1ByteDance (Volcano Engine + BytePlus)gnoc@bytedance.com, bd_abuse@bytedance.com~90Unknown โ€” first test of ByteDance abuse pipeline
2UCloud HKhegui@ucloud.cn73Slow but responsive
3Microsoft Azuremsrc@microsoft.com56Good โ€” established abuse pipeline
4PT Cloud IndonesiaAPNIC abuse contact46Uncertain โ€” regional provider
5DigitalOceanabuse@digitalocean.com38Good โ€” fast response
6Tencent Cloudsecurity@tencent.com35Moderate
7KoDDoS / Amarutu (Seychelles)abuse@koddos.com~20Low โ€” bulletproof hoster
8Cloudie Limitedabuse@cloudie.hk8None โ€” Spamhaus ASN-DROP listed
โš ๏ธ Critical Update โ€” The Campaign Never Declined

The apparent volume decline starting April 21 was not an operational wind-down. On April 21, 2026, the botnet operator silently upgraded the SSH scanning library from libssh 0.11.1 to libssh 0.12.0, rotating the HASSH fingerprint from 03a80b21afa8โ€ฆ to af8223ac9914โ€ฆ. Any monitoring system tracking only the old fingerprint would see a campaign dying. In reality, the botnet was growing โ€” recruiting 351 fresh IPs while 186 existing nodes switched to the new toolkit. The mdrfckr RSA key, the 345gs5662d34 marker credential, the 15-command hardware fingerprint, the rival-botnet cleanup routine โ€” all identical. Only the SSH library version changed. This is the operational security of a 6-year veteran.

๐Ÿ”„ Combined Campaign Metrics โ€” After Fingerprint Switch
1,639
Combined Unique IPs
(1,288 old + 351 new-only)
51,960
Total Sessions
(35,853 + 16,107)
186
IPs Confirmed Switched
(appeared with both HASSH)
22
Days Since Upgrade
(Apr 21 โ†’ May 12, ongoing)
Before: libssh 0.11.1 (HASSH 03a80b21โ€ฆ)
Active: March 28 โ€“ May 12 (declining after Apr 21)
Unique IPs: 1,288
Sessions: 35,853
Peak: 2,557 attempts/day (April 3)
After: libssh 0.12.0 (HASSH af8223acโ€ฆ)
Active: April 21 โ€“ ongoing
Unique IPs: 537 (186 switched + 351 new)
Sessions: 16,107 in 22 days
Pace: ~732 sessions/day (vs 797/day before)
๐ŸŽฏ What Changed โ€” And What Didn't
SSH library versionlibssh 0.11.1 โ†’ libssh 0.12.0
HASSH fingerprint03a80b21afa8โ€ฆ โ†’ af8223ac9914โ€ฆ
RSA backdoor key (mdrfckr)Identical โ€” same key blob, same comment
345gs5662d34 markerPresent (19 new-wave IPs)
Hardware fingerprint (15 cmds)Identical โ€” same commands, same order
Rival cleanup (secure.sh, auth.sh)Identical
Credential dictionaryExpanded โ€” core passwords retained + new entries added

The toolkit upgrade included a refreshed credential dictionary โ€” retaining the core mdrfckr passwords while adding new entries that reveal continued intelligence gathering by the operator:

UsernamePasswordIPsAnalysis
admin1234admin123451Self-referential (username=password) โ€” targets lazy admin account setup
rootnPSpP4PBW047New randomly-generated password โ€” possibly harvested from a real breach
rootAa112211.44๐Ÿ‡จ๐Ÿ‡ณ Chinese keyboard pattern: paired numbers, complexity bypass
proxyuserproxyuser23Targeting SOCKS/HTTP proxy servers โ€” new target class
seekcyJoysuch@Locate202016Retained from 2020 dictionary โ€” old password, still works somewhere
seekcyJoysuch@Locate20263Same username, year bumped 2020โ†’2026 โ€” real-time dictionary maintenance
sysadminsysadmin@116Enterprise sysadmin targeting with minimal complexity
rootMoeClub.org11๐Ÿ‡จ๐Ÿ‡ณ MoeClub = Chinese tech community (Linux reinstall scripts)
trojanuser1234564Targeting machines already backdoored with "trojanuser" accounts
sockssocks9SOCKS5 proxy default โ€” proxy infrastructure targeting
openvpnopenvpn4OpenVPN server default credentials
frappeFrappe33Frappe ERPNext v3 targeting โ€” version-specific
๐Ÿ” The seekcy:Joysuch@Locate Evolution โ€” Dictionary Maintenance Caught Live

The credential pair seekcy:Joysuch@Locate2020 (16 IPs) and seekcy:Joysuch@Locate2026 (3 IPs) provides a rare window into active dictionary maintenance. The same username with the year portion bumped from 2020 to 2026 means the operator reviewed the dictionary, identified a year-tagged entry, and created an updated variant โ€” while keeping the old one (because servers set passwords once and never change them). The 2026 variant appearing on only 3 IPs suggests it was added to the dictionary very recently, during the 0.12.0 rollout.

๐Ÿ†• AS272857 โ€” MAXI CABLE C.A. (Venezuela) โ€” 17 IPs in 38.255.75.0/24
A new infrastructure cluster not present in the pre-upgrade campaign. 17 IPs in a single /24 block registered to MAXI CABLE C.A., a Venezuelan ISP (AS272857), but geolocated to the US โ€” suggesting US-hosted servers announced via Venezuelan BGP. This dense concentration (17 IPs in one subnet) is consistent with bulk VPS provisioning โ€” the operator rented a batch of cheap servers from this provider specifically for the upgraded wave. This pattern mirrors the UCloud HK cluster (73 IPs in AS135377) from the original campaign.
New-Only IPs โ€” Geographic Distribution (351 IPs, 57 Countries)
๐Ÿ‡บ๐Ÿ‡ธ US โ€” 72
๐Ÿ‡ญ๐Ÿ‡ฐ HK โ€” 30
๐Ÿ‡ฐ๐Ÿ‡ท KR โ€” 27
๐Ÿ‡ฎ๐Ÿ‡ฉ ID โ€” 27
๐Ÿ‡ธ๐Ÿ‡ฌ SG โ€” 24
๐Ÿ‡ป๐Ÿ‡ณ VN โ€” 18
๐Ÿ‡ฎ๐Ÿ‡ณ IN โ€” 12
๐Ÿ‡ซ๐Ÿ‡ท FR โ€” 11
๐Ÿ‡ท๐Ÿ‡บ RU โ€” 10
๐Ÿ‡จ๐Ÿ‡ด CO โ€” 8
๐Ÿ‡น๐Ÿ‡ญ TH โ€” 7
๐Ÿ‡ฌ๐Ÿ‡ง GB โ€” 7

The US share increased significantly (20.5% vs 14.1% in old campaign) โ€” the operator is diversifying toward Western cloud providers in the 0.12.0 wave.

The fingerprint switch from libssh 0.11.1 to 0.12.0 is not a trivial library update โ€” it's an operational rotation designed to evade signature-based detection. Any firewall, IDS, or honeypot tracking HASSH 03a80b21afa8โ€ฆ lost visibility on April 21. The attack traffic continued at nearly identical volume (~732 sessions/day vs ~797/day before), but under a new fingerprint that reset all detection counters.

This tells us three things about the operator:

  1. They are aware of HASSH fingerprinting โ€” the upgrade specifically changes the KEX algorithm negotiation order, which is what HASSH measures
  2. They maintain the botnet as a software project โ€” the dictionary was refreshed, new target classes added (proxy servers, OpenVPN), and version-tagged credentials updated (seekcy 2020โ†’2026)
  3. They are not done โ€” 351 new IPs recruited in 22 days means active expansion, not wind-down. The Maxi Cable Venezuela cluster (17 IPs in one /24) suggests bulk provisioning for scale

The mdrfckr botnet with combined fingerprints now stands at 1,639 unique IPs across 84+ countries โ€” making it, to our knowledge, one of the largest SSH credential-spraying operations documented from a single honeypot vantage point. And the only reason we caught the switch is that 186 IPs appeared with both fingerprints โ€” the same machines, running the same payload, just with a newer SSH library. Without that overlap, the two campaigns would appear unrelated.

The same key. Six years. Now with version control.

โš–๏ธ
CLASSIFIED INTELLIGENCE BRIEF
Actionable for Law Enforcement, CERTs, and Regulatory Authorities

This section presents verified corporate structures, compromised institutional endpoints, financial assessments, and takedown recommendations derived from APNIC/RIPE/ARIN RDAP records, Spamhaus ASN-DROP feeds, BGP routing data, and direct honeypot observation. All entities are named with registry-verified identifiers. This intelligence is published to enable authorized structures with legal tools and jurisdiction to act against this criminal infrastructure.

๐ŸŽญPART I โ€” THREAT ACTOR PROFILE

Group Name
Outlaw / mdrfckr / Haiduc / Dota
First Observed
October 2018 (Trend Micro)
Assessed Origin
Romania (HIGH confidence)
Motivation
Financial (Cryptomining + DDoS-for-hire)
Active Duration
7+ years (continuous, never disrupted)
Arrests / Indictments
NONE โ€” Zero law enforcement action

Romanian Attribution Evidence

Evidence Type Detail Confidence
Operator Handles luci, lucian, dragos โ€” Romanian names found as Unix usernames on staging servers HIGH
C2 Domain luci.madweb.ro โ€” Romanian .ro domain in original 2018 campaign HIGH
Tool Name "Haiduc" โ€” Romanian word for brigand/outlaw, culturally specific term HIGH
Activity Timing Exclusively CET daytime hours, no weekends โ€” consistent with Romanian timezone HIGH
Code Comments Romanian-language strings in IRC bouncer configuration (per Trend Micro appendix) HIGH
Chinese Credential Patterns Wordlist contains 888888, 520520, Huawei12#$, QQ references โ€” indicates Chinese-speaking targets, not operators MEDIUM (targeting, not origin)

Known Operator Identifiers

IRC handles: luci, lucian, dragos, mazy, hydra, poseidon
Bot nickname pattern: sEx-[random_integer] (e.g., sEx-3635)
Credential marker: 345gs5662d34:345gs5662d34 (botnet self-authentication)
SSH key comment: mdrfckr (persistent 6+ years, unchanged)
RSA exponent: 0x25 (37) โ€” non-standard, deliberate cryptographic watermark

Financial Assessment

Period Est. Hosts Monthly Revenue (USD) Revenue Source
2018 (peak) 180,000 $7,500โ€“$15,000 XMR mining + DDoS-for-hire
2019 100,000 $8,000โ€“$16,000 XMR mining + DDoS-for-hire
2020โ€“2022 20,000โ€“50,000 $3,000โ€“$10,000 XMR mining
2023โ€“2024 5,000โ€“15,000 $600โ€“$2,400 XMR mining
2025โ€“2026 (observed) 1,639 $450โ€“$1,500 XMR mining
Total Estimated 7-Year Revenue $500Kโ€“$3M USD Conservative estimate

Applicable Criminal Charges

Jurisdiction Law Charges Agency
๐Ÿ‡ท๐Ÿ‡ด Romania Penal Code Art. 360โ€“366 Unauthorized access, data alteration, botnet operation (organized crime aggravation) DIICOT
๐Ÿ‡บ๐Ÿ‡ธ United States 18 U.S.C. ยง 1030 (CFAA) Unauthorized access, intentional damage, wire fraud, conspiracy FBI Cyber Division
๐Ÿ‡ช๐Ÿ‡บ European Union Directive 2013/40/EU Attacks against information systems Europol EC3
๐ŸŒ International Budapest Convention (2001) Computer crime, mutual legal assistance Interpol

Precedent: The Romanian Bayrob Group (arrested 2016, extradited to US 2017, sentenced in Cleveland) โ€” identical jurisdictional pathway. Romania-US MLAT is active; Romania participates in Europol J-CAT.

๐ŸขPART II โ€” CORPORATE STRUCTURES (REGISTRY-VERIFIED)

All entities below are verified from APNIC RDAP, RIPE NCC RDAP, ARIN RDAP, LACNIC, and Spamhaus ASN-DROP feeds. Physical addresses, contact names, and phone numbers are from authoritative registry records.

ENTITY 1: CLOUDIE LIMITED PURE BPH
9 ASNs โ€” ALL on Spamhaus DROP
Address: Unit 1604, Perfect Industrial Building, 31 Tai Yau Street, San Po Kong, Kowloon, Hong Kong
Key Persons: Wing Wu (admin, registered 2015), BingRong Jiang (AS134196), "pang" (newest entities, pang@law.sm)
Phone: +852-61725306 (shared across 3 ostensibly separate companies)
Email: admin@cloudie.hk / abuse@cloudie.hk (IRT validated but non-responsive)
AS55933 CLOUDIE-AS-AP  โ”‚  AS133731 CLOUDIE-AS-AP  โ”‚  AS134176 CLOUDIE-AS-AP
AS134196 Anyun Internet Technology (HK) โ€” same address, same phone, same abuse email
AS154206 CDN1.com Limited โ€” Unit 210, Laurels Industrial Building, 31 Tai Yau St (same street)
AS24544 Law's Cloud Infrastructure Ltd โ€” rebranded 2026-05-06 (days before this report!)
AS38871 InfoMove Solutions โ€” New Tech Plaza, 34 Tai Yau St  โ”‚  AS25862 ISNX  โ”‚  AS138687 XDEER-AS-AP

๐Ÿ”ด Classic shell-company rotation: same building, same phone, same abuse IRT (IRT-CLOUDIE1-HK), different company names. When one ASN is blocklisted, a new entity is registered at the same physical address with a fresh ASN. The 2026-05-06 rebranding of AS24544 to "Law's Cloud Infrastructure" demonstrates active evasion in progress.

ENTITY 2: KoDDoS / AMARUTU TECHNOLOGY LTD PURE BPH
AS206264 โ€” RIPE NCC
Paper Address: Level 23, One Island East, 18 Westlands Road, Hong Kong (prestigious virtual office ~HKD 1,200/yr)
Real Jurisdiction: Seychelles (phone +248-4225244; maintainer prefix "sc-" = Seychelles)
Contact: Ronald Linco (likely pseudonym or nominee director)
Brand: koddos.net โ€” markets "10โ€“350 Gbps DDoS protection" (cover for hosting attack infrastructure)
BGP Peers: 321 โ€” including Tier-1: NTT, Arelion, Cogent, TATA, GTT, Telstra

๐Ÿ”ด Seychelles incorporation provides: no extradition treaties, minimal disclosure, strong corporate secrecy. "DDoS protection" branding provides plausible cover for hosting servers that specifically won't be taken down.

ENTITY 3: VOLCANO ENGINE (ByteDance) NEGLIGENT
AS137718 โ€” #1 provider (65 IPs)
Legal Entity: Beijing Volcano Engine Technology Co., Ltd. (ByteDance subsidiary)
Address: 1309, 13/F, Building 4, Zijin Digital Park, Haidian District, Beijing
Abuse Email: gnoc@bytedance.com (NOC, not dedicated abuse desk)
Tech Contact: Zhang Zhaoyang (zhangzhaoyang.1@bytedance.com)
Admin Contact: Chen Qi (+86-10-13051468788)
IP Block: 14.103.0.0/16 (reassigned from China Telecom 2022-05-19 โ€” commonly misattributed in GeoIP databases)
Parent: ByteDance ($155B revenue 2024) โ€” 1% Chinese state golden share
Pricing: ~$7โ€“44/month/instance (60โ€“80% cheaper than AWS) โ€” creates low-cost attack infrastructure incentive
KYC: Real-name ID required (China CSL Art. 24) but enforcement inconsistent; black-market IDs available ~ยฅ50โ€“200
Abuse SLA: None publicly documented (cf. AWS 24-hour critical response)
IRT created: 2022-05-19 (abuse handling was afterthought โ€” 4 years after ASN registration)

Legal lever: China Cybersecurity Law Art. 47 obligates Volcano Engine to investigate/remediate known botnet activity upon notice. Failure to act is itself a violation. Report to CNCERT/CC (cert.org.cn) and MIIT.

ENTITY 4: UCLOUD INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (HK) NEGLIGENT
AS135377 โ€” #2 provider (73 IPs)
Parent: UCloud Technology (ไผ˜ๅˆปๅพ—, SSE STAR Market ticker 688158 โ€” publicly traded)
HK Address: Flat/RM 603, 6/F, Laws Commercial Plaza, 788 Cheung Sha Wan Road, Kowloon
Phone: +86-18221224857 (Chinese mobile, despite HK entity)
Abuse Emails: hegui@ucloud.cn / pn-wan@ucloud.cn (validated 2026-02-27)
Pricing: ~$5โ€“40/month (international platform, USD accepted, PayPal)

Accountability lever: SSE-listed company (688158) โ€” persistent unresolved abuse can be raised with SSE compliance or MIIT regulators. Public company = shareholder accountability and disclosure requirements.

ENTITY 5: YISU CLOUD LIMITED OPAQUE
AS138152 + AS142403
HK Address: 10/F, World Peace Centre, 41-55 Wo Tong Tsui Street, Kwai Chung
Actual Operations: 9F, Cable TV Building, Haisheng Road, Liwan District, Guangzhou, China
Email: lph@yisu.com โ€” EXPLICITLY MARKED INVALID BY APNIC (2026-03-29)
Prefixes: 45 IPv4 (11,520 IPs), only 5 BGP peers (unusually few)

๐ŸŸก Invalid abuse contact confirmed by APNIC = deliberate non-responsiveness. HK corporate / Guangzhou operations split is textbook Chinese BPH pattern for international banking + domestic infrastructure.

ENTITY 6: MAXI CABLE C.A. SUSPECTED SHELL
AS272857 โ€” LACNIC
Jurisdiction: Venezuela (C.A. = Compaรฑรญa Anรณnima)
ASN Allocated: 2022-09-05 (less than 3 years old)
IP Block: 38.255.75.0/24 โ€” registered to Cogent Communications (US sub-allocation)
Physical Location: US (Cogent datacenter) despite Venezuelan ASN
BGP Peers: 1 (single upstream = Cogent)
Bot Density: 17/256 IPs (6.6% of the /24 โ€” extraordinary for legitimate ISP)

๐Ÿ”ด 3-year-old Venezuelan ASN with zero hosted domains, single peer, US-located IPs, and 6.6% bot density is not consistent with legitimate cable TV operations. Likely purpose-registered for botnet hosting. Report to: abuse@cogentco.com (fastest takedown path) + abuse@lacnic.net

ENTITY 7: FRANTECH SOLUTIONS / BuyVM โ€” C2 HOST ACTIVE C2
AS53667 (PONYNET)
Operator: Francisco Dias (FDI19-ARIN)
Personal Address: 6725 Sacred Palm Street, Las Vegas, NV 89086
Business Address: 1621 Central Ave, Cheyenne, WY 82001 (Wyoming LLC)
Phone: +1-702-728-8933
Email: fdias@frantech.ca / admin@frantech.ca
C2 Server: bullshit-irc.net โ€” 198.98.56.205 โ€” ports 6667/6697 (IRC/IRC-TLS)
โš ๏ธ THIS IS THE ACTIVE COMMAND & CONTROL SERVER. All 1,639 botnet nodes receive instructions from bullshit-irc.net. Termination of this single endpoint would disable real-time operator control over the entire fleet. The server is a customer VPS on FranTech's 198.98.48.0/20 allocation.

Immediate action: Abuse report to admin@frantech.ca citing ToS violation (IRC botnet C2). If unresponsive: FBI IC3 report + ARIN escalation. FranTech is a US entity โ€” fully subject to US CFAA and can be compelled by court order.

๐Ÿ›๏ธPART III โ€” COMPROMISED INSTITUTIONAL VICTIMS

The following government-owned, educational, and critical infrastructure entities are confirmed compromised by the Outlaw/mdrfckr botnet based on direct honeypot observation and IP enrichment data. These findings represent active threats to national security, critical infrastructure, and citizen data.

# Entity Country Severity Key Risk CERT Contact
1 BSNL (Bharat Sanchar Nigam) ๐Ÿ‡ฎ๐Ÿ‡ณ India CRITICAL 122M customers; national backbone; 4 compromised IPs; repeat breach victim CERT-In (6hr mandatory)
2 NTC Pakistan (HQ) ๐Ÿ‡ต๐Ÿ‡ฐ Pakistan CRITICAL Government/military telecom; Kubernetes API (port 6443) + MQTT exposed PKCERT (immediate)
3 KIFU/NIIF โ€” Bรฉkรฉs Special School ๐Ÿ‡ญ๐Ÿ‡บ Hungary (EU) HIGH Children's special needs data; GDPR Art. 9 mandatory 72hr breach notification NAIH + HunCERT
4 VNPT (Vietnam Posts & Telecom) ๐Ÿ‡ป๐Ÿ‡ณ Vietnam HIGH 10 IPs; full web stack (Squid+PostgreSQL+Redis); e-government infra; $6.5B revenue VNCERT/CC + A05
5 MPT Myanmar ๐Ÿ‡ฒ๐Ÿ‡ฒ Myanmar HIGH L2TP VPN + Kubernetes API; junta-controlled; KDDI/Sumitomo ($2B invested) KDDI Corp + JPCERT
6 Uganda Telecom ๐Ÿ‡บ๐Ÿ‡ฌ Uganda HIGH Live SuiteCRM (customer data) + Xen hypervisor host compromised UCC + CERT-UG
7 Gunadarma University ๐Ÿ‡ฎ๐Ÿ‡ฉ Indonesia HIGH 80โ€“100K students; own ASN; OpenSSH 7.6p1 (9 years unpatched) BSSN (Indonesia)
8 Nepal Telecom ๐Ÿ‡ณ๐Ÿ‡ต Nepal MED-HIGH National monopoly carrier; 20M users; 2 nodes compromised CIRT.np + NTA
โš ๏ธ Critical Cross-Cutting Observation

The two Kubernetes API findings (Pakistan NTC + Myanmar MPT) represent nation-state level risk exposure delivered by a financially-motivated botnet. Container orchestration at government/military scale with a persistent SHELLBOT backdoor creates a pathway to classified application infrastructure. Additionally, 97 IPs have exposed databases (MySQL/PostgreSQL/MongoDB/Redis) and 4 Starlink terminals in Bogota, Colombia are confirmed compromised. The cryptomining is the revenue stream. The backdoor is the weapon.

๐Ÿ’ฐPART IV โ€” INFRASTRUCTURE COST MODEL

Provider IPs $/instance/mo Monthly Total Annual Total
Volcano Engine (AS137718) 65 $7โ€“15 $455โ€“$975 $5,460โ€“$11,700
BytePlus (AS150436) 25 $10โ€“20 $250โ€“$500 $3,000โ€“$6,000
UCloud HK (AS135377) 73 $8โ€“18 $584โ€“$1,314 $7,008โ€“$15,768
FranTech/BuyVM (C2) 1 $3.50 $3.50 $42
PAID INFRASTRUCTURE TOTAL 163+ ~$1,300โ€“$2,800 ~$15,600โ€“$33,600

The remaining ~1,476 IPs are compromised victims (ISPs, universities, government telcos) โ€” zero cost to the operator. The C2 server costs $3.50/month. The entire command infrastructure for a 1,639-node botnet costs less than a Netflix subscription. Equivalent AWS infrastructure would cost 3โ€“5ร— more (~$3,600โ€“$8,100/month), explaining the preference for Chinese cloud providers.

๐ŸŽฏPART V โ€” PRIORITIZED TAKEDOWN RECOMMENDATIONS

P1
KILL THE C2 โ€” bullshit-irc.net (198.98.56.205)
Single point of failure. Without IRC C2, operator loses real-time control of entire fleet. Bots will continue mining on last instructions but cannot receive new commands, target lists, or updates.
Action: Abuse report โ†’ admin@frantech.ca. If no response in 48h: FBI IC3 + court order (US jurisdiction, trivial).
P2
PROTECT CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE โ€” Notify CERTs
Simultaneous notification to CERT-In (BSNL), PKCERT (NTC military), NAIH/HunCERT (children's data), VNCERT/CC (VNPT). India's CERT-In mandates 6-hour response for critical infra. Hungary's GDPR requires 72-hour breach notification. Pakistan NTC has Kubernetes API exposed to internet on military network โ€” immediate national security concern.
P3
DISMANTLE PAID INFRASTRUCTURE โ€” Cloud Provider Reports
Report to Volcano Engine (gnoc@bytedance.com, CC zhangzhaoyang.1@bytedance.com), UCloud (hegui@ucloud.cn), BytePlus (bd_abuse@bytedance.com). Cite China CSL Art. 47 obligation. Report Maxi Cable to abuse@cogentco.com (fastest path). For non-responsive providers: escalate to CNCERT/CC (cert.org.cn) and SingCERT (go.gov.sg/singcert-report).
P4
IDENTIFY & ARREST OPERATORS โ€” DIICOT Referral
Romanian DIICOT has jurisdiction. Known handles: lucian, dragos (Romanian names). CET timezone activity pattern. Bayrob precedent (2016) shows Romaniaโ†’US extradition pathway is established. Suggested route: Europol EC3 โ†’ J-CAT โ†’ DIICOT, with parallel FBI Cyber Division notification via MLAT. IRC traffic monitoring of bullshit-irc.net would yield real-time operator communications.
P5
LONG-TERM โ€” BPH ECOSYSTEM DISRUPTION
APNIC deregistration request for Cloudie cluster (9 ASNs, all invalid); RIPE NCC action on KoDDoS/Amarutu. Pressure Tier-1 carriers (NTT, Cogent, Arelion) to deactivate BPH transit contracts. Hong Kong Companies Registry investigation of shell entities at 31 Tai Yau Street.

๐Ÿ—บ๏ธPART VI โ€” MITRE ATT&CK MAPPING (KEY TECHNIQUES)

Tactic Technique ID Outlaw Implementation
Initial Access Brute Force: Password Guessing T1110.001 Haiduc/tsm64 SSH scanner, 27โ€“102 credential pairs per target
Persistence SSH Authorized Keys T1098.004 mdrfckr RSA key injection (unchanged 6+ years)
Persistence Scheduled Task: Cron T1053.003 Miners as cron/anacron; .satan service installer
Defense Evasion Hidden Files and Directories T1564.001 .bin/, .mountfs/, .rsync/, .vd/, .configrc6/
Defense Evasion Masquerading T1036.004 Miner named "cron"/"anacron"; bot as /usr/sbin/httpd
C2 Application Layer: IRC T1071.003 ShellBot โ†’ bullshit-irc.net:6667/6697
Lateral Movement Remote Services: SSH T1021.004 Self-propagation via SSH brute force from every compromised host
Impact Resource Hijacking T1496 XMRig Monero mining on all hosts; DDoS floods (UDP/TCP/HTTP)

๐Ÿ”PART VII โ€” DETECTION & HUNTING SIGNATURES

YARA Rule โ€” Outlaw/mdrfckr 2026
rule Outlaw_mdrfckr_2026 {
    meta:
        description = "Outlaw/mdrfckr botnet SSH key injection + attack sequence"
        author      = "LSN Threat Intelligence"
        date        = "2026-05-12"
        tlp         = "WHITE"
    strings:
        $key_comment = "mdrfckr"
        $marker      = "345gs5662d34"
        $lockr       = "lockr -ia .ssh"
        $hosts_deny  = "echo > /etc/hosts.deny"
        $chattr      = "chattr -ia .ssh"
        $rsync_dir   = ".mountfs/.rsync/"
        $satan_svc   = ".satan"
    condition:
        2 of them
}
SSH Key Detection (run on any Linux host)
# Detect by key comment
grep -r "mdrfckr" /root/.ssh/ /home/*/.ssh/ 2>/dev/null

# Detect by SHA256 fingerprint
ssh-keygen -l -f /root/.ssh/authorized_keys 2>/dev/null | \
  grep "MkYY9qiVsFGBC5WkjoClCkwEFW5iSjcGQF7m4n4H7Cw"

# Detect hidden botnet directories
ls -la /tmp/.bin/ /tmp/.vd/ ~/.rsync/ ~/.configrc6/ ~/.mountfs/ 2>/dev/null

# Detect masqueraded processes
ps aux | grep -E "cron|anacron" | grep -v "/usr/sbin/cron"
Network IOCs (block at firewall)
# C2 Server (IMMEDIATE BLOCK)
198.98.56.205    # bullshit-irc.net โ€” IRC C2
Port 6667/tcp    # IRC plain
Port 6697/tcp    # IRC TLS

# HASSH Fingerprints (SSH client signatures)
03a80b21afa810682a776a7d42e5e6fb  # SSH-2.0-libssh_0.11.1 (original wave)
af8223ac9914f509afdadfaf5f7ee94e  # SSH-2.0-libssh_0.12.0 (upgraded wave, Apr 21)

# RSA Key SHA256
MkYY9qiVsFGBC5WkjoClCkwEFW5iSjcGQF7m4n4H7Cw

๐Ÿ“ŠPART VIII โ€” COMPARATIVE THREAT LANDSCAPE

Attribute Outlaw/mdrfckr TeamTNT Kinsing 8220 Gang
First Seen 2018 2019 2019 2017
Origin Romania Germany Unknown (Chinese?) Chinese
Primary Vector SSH brute force Docker/K8s API PHP/Docker exploits CVEs (Log4Shell, Confluence)
Peak Size 180,000+ hosts 30,000+ 10,000+ 30,000+
DDoS Capable YES No No No
Active Duration 7+ years (never disrupted) ~2 years (disbanded) 6 years 9 years
Arrests ZERO Zero Zero Zero

What makes Outlaw unique: Extreme longevity (7+ years continuous, same RSA key), dual-revenue model (mining + DDoS-for-hire), the widest geographic spread (84+ countries), and complete absence of any law enforcement action despite clear Romanian attribution evidence. No other financially-motivated botnet of this scale has operated with such impunity for so long.

โ“PART IX โ€” INTELLIGENCE GAPS & SUGGESTED FOLLOW-UP

Gap Detail Suggested Action
Operator Real Identity Handles "lucian"/"dragos" known; passport-level ID unknown DIICOT investigation; IRC traffic monitoring
Monero Wallet Address Not directly observed (payload not detonated in honeypot) Sandbox detonation of downloaded payload
IRC Channel Content C2 confirmed active but traffic not monitored Passive IRC monitoring of bullshit-irc.net:6667
Cloudie Shell Directors Wing Wu, BingRong Jiang, "pang" โ€” not verified against HK CR HK Companies Registry (ICRIS) query for each entity
Full Botnet Size 1,639 observed in 20-day window; actual fleet likely larger Network telescope / darknet monitoring
Chinese Operator Theory Credential patterns suggest Chinese-speaking involvement (LOW-MED) Cross-reference BytePlus account registration patterns
๐Ÿ“‹ Sources & Methodology

This intelligence brief is compiled from: APNIC RDAP (AS137718, AS150436, AS135377, AS55933, AS134196, AS154206, AS138152, AS142403, AS272857); RIPE NCC RDAP (AS206264, AS35100); ARIN RDAP (AS53667); Spamhaus ASN-DROP JSON feed (live, 2026-05-12); BGP.he.net (peering data, prefix ownership); LSN Honeypot (direct observation, 1,639 IPs, 51,960 sessions, April 4โ€“May 12, 2026); Trend Micro (Oct 2018, Nov 2018, Jun 2019, Apr 2025); Microsoft Azure Security Center (May 2019); Shodan (port/service fingerprints); GreyNoise (classification data); AbuseIPDB (reputation scores). All registry data is authoritative and court-admissible. Honeypot observations represent passive collection without active intrusion.

The mdrfckr botnet is not sophisticated by nation-state standards. It does not exploit zero-days. It does not target critical infrastructure. It brute-forces weak SSH passwords on Ubuntu VMs, game servers, and business ERP systems โ€” the kinds of servers that a small business, indie developer, or gaming community operates with a cheap VPS and a default password.

And yet: 1,639 hosts across 84+ countries, 456+ autonomous systems, every major cloud provider on the planet, Starlink terminals in rural locations, Korean home NAS devices, Indonesian web hosting, Seychelles bulletproof hosting, Venezuelan bulk VPS โ€” all stitched together by one RSA public key that a Romanian-origin threat group has been reusing since 2018, now operated (or at minimum, maintained) by a Chinese-speaking actor who knows what 888 means, what QQ is, and how to buy VPS instances on ByteDance's cloud with Alipay.

The same key. For six years. And it still works.

That's the real story. Not the sophistication of the attack โ€” the simplicity. The mdrfckr botnet doesn't need to be clever. It just needs ubuntu:Password01 to remain the most common credential on cloud VMs in 2026. And it is.

Data source: Cowrie SSH honeypot (port 2222). Analysis period: March 28 โ€“ May 12, 2026 (45 days, ongoing). OSINT enrichment: Shodan InternetDB (844 IPs), GreyNoise Community, Team Cymru, APNIC/RIPE RDAP. Infrastructure research: APNIC WHOIS, RIPE RDAP, Spamhaus ASN-DROP, BGP.HE, IPInfo, company websites, cPanel CSI forensics tool, independent honeypot datasets (HK, UK, USA, AUS T-POT, Azure, Cowrie 48hr). All IOCs are published for community defense. Personal data appears exactly as public registries return it.

โš  Personal capacity. Research published independently โ€” not reflecting employer views. Derived from passive observation of attacks against personal infrastructure. Full disclaimer โ†’
โ† Previous Honeypot Field Reports โ€” 13 / 20 Next โ†’