LSN โ€” Local Sovereign Network

TI-2026-032: The American Mirror A ยท B ยท C ยท D ยท E ยท F ยท G ยท H

032A โ€” The Buffalo Server Farm

ColoCrossing โ†’ HostPapa โ†’ RackNerd: How a Buffalo Data Center Became America's Abuse Funnel

Executive Summary

After publishing a ten-letter forensic investigation of Chinese cloud infrastructure (TI-2026-031), intellectual honesty demands we turn the same lens on American providers. We begin in Buffalo, New York โ€” with ColoCrossing, a data center company that Spamhaus has publicly named for hosting botnet command-and-control infrastructure, that was acquired by Canadian web hosting company HostPapa in 2024, and whose IP space is overwhelmingly registered to a single reseller: RackNerd LLC.

The numbers are damning: 74 IPs in our threat intelligence database, 47.5 average threat score (nearly double the Chinese average), 821 honeypot hits, and 100% abuse score on virtually every tracked IP. Fourteen of RackNerd's highest-threat IPs all belong to the same HASSH campaign โ€” a 628-IP botnet using libssh2_1.11.0 that spans 48 countries. A Buffalo server farm feeds a global attack network.

I. The Corporate Genealogy

The ownership chain of AS36352 reads like a case study in infrastructure laundering through acquisition:

YearEntityRoleLocation
~2005ColoCrossingFounded as colocation/dedicated server providerBuffalo, NY
2010sColoCrossingNamed by Spamhaus for botnet C&C hostingBuffalo, NY
2024-01-04HostPapa Inc.Acquires ColoCrossing (ARIN record change)Burlington, ON, Canada
PresentHostPapa (AS-COLOCROSSING)ASN holder, ARIN Org ID: HOSTP-7325 Delaware Ave Ste 300, Buffalo, NY 14202

The ARIN RDAP record tells the story: the ASN is still AS-COLOCROSSING in name, but the organization is now HOSTP-7 (HostPapa). The address is 325 Delaware Avenue, Suite 300, Buffalo, NY 14202 โ€” a commercial office building in downtown Buffalo. HostPapa, a Canadian company that markets itself as a "green" web hosting provider for small businesses, now owns the infrastructure that Spamhaus flagged for botnet hosting.

The Acquisition Question

When HostPapa acquired ColoCrossing, did they acquire the abuse problem too? The data says yes. Our database shows 33 IPs registered directly to HostPapa with an average threat score of 36.6, and 30 IPs registered to RackNerd LLC operating on the same AS36352 with an average threat score of 55.6. The reseller's IPs are MORE dangerous than the parent company's โ€” by 52%.

II. The Reseller Layer: RackNerd LLC

This is the critical finding. Of 74 IPs tracked on AS36352, the ownership breaks down as follows:

RDAP RegistrantIPsAvg ThreatHoneypot HitsPattern
HostPapa3336.6276Direct registration
RackNerd LLC3055.6470Reseller
Shaka Rover256.00Unknown entity
Foroquimica SL193.072Spanish company on US infra
HostCram LLC158.00Reseller
Hudson Valley Host158.00Reseller
Erin Cross158.00Individual name
Cloud IT Assets15.00Reseller
CENTRIOHOST-LLC147.00Reseller
RackNerd NOC179.00RackNerd operations
NETTECH-COLOCROSSING159.01Legacy ColoCrossing
NETOPS160.02Operations account

RackNerd LLC is a dedicated server and VPS reseller offering services starting at $2.24/month. They operate from Los Angeles and sell servers in 12 locations worldwide. At that price point, customer vetting is essentially nonexistent โ€” the economics of $2.24/month hosting do not support abuse investigation staff.

The reseller model creates a three-layer accountability gap:

  1. Layer 1: HostPapa/ColoCrossing โ€” owns the physical infrastructure and ASN. "Not our customer, it's our reseller's customer."
  2. Layer 2: RackNerd LLC โ€” rents IP blocks and sells VPS at $2.24/month. "We offer infrastructure, we don't monitor customer traffic."
  3. Layer 3: End user โ€” anonymous, pays with cryptocurrency or disposable payment methods. Runs the botnet.

The $2.24 Problem

At $2.24/month, a threat actor pays $26.88/year for a VPS that generates 66 honeypot hits and carries a threat score of 99. The economics make disposable attack infrastructure cheaper than a Netflix subscription. When the IP gets reported, they spin up another โ€” on the same ASN, through the same reseller, from the same Buffalo data center.

III. The Botnet Signature

The most striking finding: all 14 high-threat RackNerd IPs (threat โ‰ฅ 70) belong to the same HASSH campaign cluster โ€” hassh-14b2ddda386a4d10.

IPThreatHitsCampaign
107.174.90.239966hassh-14b2ddda386a4d10
107.172.88.2068530hassh-14b2ddda386a4d10
23.94.200.1948348hassh-14b2ddda386a4d10
192.3.127.408324hassh-14b2ddda386a4d10
23.94.104.2518212hassh-14b2ddda386a4d10
107.173.122.158212hassh-14b2ddda386a4d10
96.8.116.348224hassh-14b2ddda386a4d10
23.95.20.1687736hassh-14b2ddda386a4d10
192.210.194.27654hassh-14b2ddda386a4d10
192.3.206.667542hassh-14b2ddda386a4d10
192.3.150.587530hassh-14b2ddda386a4d10
23.94.92.987530hassh-14b2ddda386a4d10
198.23.249.857318hassh-14b2ddda386a4d10
23.94.14.160716hassh-14b2ddda386a4d10

This campaign โ€” "HASSH Cluster (libssh2_1.11.0)" โ€” is massive: 628 IPs across 48 countries using the same SSH client fingerprint. It is a coordinated scanner botnet. The top ASNs in this campaign are AS16276 (OVH, 45 IPs), AS32475 (SingleHop/Internap, 39 IPs), AS40676 (Psychz Networks, 34 IPs), AS36352 (ColoCrossing/HostPapa, 33 IPs), and AS35916 (MULTACOM, 26 IPs).

ColoCrossing/HostPapa is the 4th largest ASN contributor to a 628-node global botnet. And every single one of those 33 IPs is registered to the same reseller: RackNerd LLC.

One Reseller, One Botnet

RackNerd LLC does not appear to operate the botnet โ€” they provide the infrastructure. But when 100% of your high-threat customers on a specific ASN belong to the same attack campaign, something has fundamentally failed in customer vetting. Either RackNerd cannot detect botnet deployments, or they choose not to look.

IV. The Foroquimica Anomaly

Among the 12 RDAP registrants on AS36352, one stands out: Foroquimica SL.

198.46.134.148IP Address
93Threat Score
72Honeypot Hits
SpainCompany Origin

Foroquimica SL is a Spanish company โ€” "SL" is Sociedad Limitada, the Spanish equivalent of a limited liability company. A Spanish chemical/pharmaceutical supply company has a single IP on a Buffalo, New York data center, carrying a threat score of 93 and 72 honeypot hits. The IP's coordinates geolocate to 42.8865ยฐN, 78.8784ยฐW โ€” Buffalo, NY.

Either Foroquimica SL has a legitimate need for a dedicated server in Buffalo, New York โ€” or the company name is a cover registration for attack infrastructure. The RDAP record shows the IP block registered to Foroquimica SL, operating on ColoCrossing's AS36352. A Spanish chemical company. On an American hosting provider. Running 72 SSH brute-force campaigns from Buffalo.

V. The Vulnerability Landscape

HostPapa-registered IPs present a staggering vulnerability surface. One IP alone โ€” 172.245.225.106 (threat score 97) โ€” carries 25 known CVEs including:

  • CVE-2023-44487 โ€” HTTP/2 Rapid Reset (used in record-breaking DDoS attacks)
  • CVE-2021-3618 โ€” ALPACA attack (TLS protocol confusion)
  • CVE-2023-48795 โ€” Terrapin SSH prefix truncation
  • CVE-2025-26465 โ€” OpenSSH authentication bypass

Another IP โ€” 198.23.177.142 (threat score 89) โ€” has over 100 CVEs spanning Apache HTTP Server, OpenSSH, and mod_auth_openidc. These are not IoT devices with accidentally open ports โ€” they are deliberately provisioned servers running vulnerable software configurations, left unpatched on purpose or through negligence.

The 107.174.90.23 IP (our threat-99 flagship) exposes ports 80 and 443 with CVEs including CVE-2023-44487 (HTTP/2 Rapid Reset) and CVE-2021-23017 (nginx DNS resolver). GreyNoise classifies this IP as malicious. AbuseIPDB shows 290 reports.

VI. The Spamhaus Connection

Our existing investigation TI-2026-019M documented the ColoCrossing/Spamhaus nexus. Spamhaus, the world's most authoritative spam and botnet tracking organization, has publicly named ColoCrossing in their Networks Hosting Botnet Command & Control Servers resource. The relevant excerpt from their guidance:

"Resellers that allow fraudulent signups or lack proper safeguards should not be welcome on your network."

This is precisely the pattern we observe: ColoCrossing โ†’ HostPapa owns the infrastructure, RackNerd LLC is the reseller, and fraudulent signups produce a 628-IP botnet operating from $2.24/month VPS instances. Spamhaus warned about this exact scenario. The ColoCrossing acquisition by HostPapa did not fix it โ€” it just changed the name on the ASN record.

VII. The PeeringDB Profile

AS36352's PeeringDB record reveals the scale:

10,000IPv4 Prefixes
OpenPeering Policy
NSPNetwork Type
USCountry

Ten thousand IPv4 prefixes. Open peering policy. This is not a small hosting provider โ€” this is a significant network infrastructure operation advertising "Network Service Provider" status. With 10,000 prefix announcements and an open peering policy, AS36352 provides the kind of routing diversity that makes abuse harder to track and easier to relocate within the same network.

VIII. The American Mirror

We spent ten letters documenting Chinese cloud infrastructure abuse. Now consider the comparison:

MetricAceville Pte Ltd (031)ColoCrossing/HostPapa (032A)
CountrySingapore (Chinese ops)USA (Canadian parent)
IPs Tracked~5074
Avg Threat Score~3547.5
Abuse Score 100 %~70%78%
Spamhaus NamedNoYes
Reseller LayeringBytePlus/TikTokRackNerd LLC ($2.24/mo)
Botnet CampaignMultiple small628-IP unified botnet
Regulatory ScrutinyCFIUS, TikTok ban talkNone

ColoCrossing/HostPapa has more IPs, a higher average threat score, a higher abuse concentration, a Spamhaus record, and a larger botnet presence than Aceville โ€” and receives zero regulatory attention. The difference is jurisdiction and narrative. "Chinese tech company" draws congressional hearings. "Canadian-owned Buffalo data center" draws nothing.

IX. The Conspiratorial Reading

Read Between the Lines

Why did HostPapa acquire ColoCrossing?

HostPapa is a web hosting company targeting small businesses. ColoCrossing is a data center operation that Spamhaus has named for botnet hosting. The acquisition makes sense if you want data center infrastructure โ€” but why acquire one with a documented abuse reputation? Did the price reflect the reputation discount? Was the abuse infrastructure a feature rather than a bug?

Why is RackNerd LLC still operating on this ASN?

Post-acquisition, HostPapa inherited all of ColoCrossing's reseller relationships. RackNerd LLC has 30 IPs with average threat 55.6, feeding directly into a 628-IP botnet. Either HostPapa is unaware (negligence) or aware and tolerant (complicity). There is no third option when your reseller's entire high-threat IP portfolio participates in one coordinated campaign.

What is Foroquimica SL actually doing?

A Spanish SL company with a single IP in a Buffalo data center, threat score 93, 72 honeypot hits. The name means "Forum Chemistry" โ€” it could be a pharmaceutical supplier, a chemicals distributor, or a front. Spanish commercial registry (Registro Mercantil) records would reveal incorporation details, but the presence itself is the anomaly. Why does a Spanish chemical company need attack infrastructure in western New York?

The $2.24/month question

RackNerd sells VPS starting at $2.24/month. At what price point does customer verification become economically impossible? If each new customer generates $26.88/year in revenue, spending even 15 minutes on verification ($5-10 in labor costs) makes the account unprofitable. The business model structurally requires accepting malicious customers to remain viable. This isn't a failure of moderation โ€” it's a feature of the pricing model.

X. Conclusions

74IPs Tracked
47.5Avg Threat Score
821Honeypot Hits
628IPs in Linked Botnet

ColoCrossing โ€” now HostPapa โ€” is not a rogue operation. It is a legitimate American data center business that has been acquired by a legitimate Canadian web hosting company. The address is a real office building in downtown Buffalo. The PeeringDB listing shows a professional NSP operation. The HostPapa website markets "green" hosting for small businesses.

And on that same infrastructure, a reseller called RackNerd LLC sells $2.24/month VPS instances that participate in a 628-IP, 48-country botnet campaign. A Spanish company called Foroquimica SL runs attack infrastructure from Buffalo. HostPapa registered IPs carry over 100 CVEs each. Every single tracked IP has an abuse score of 100.

The Buffalo server farm is a mirror. It reflects back every criticism America directs at Chinese cloud infrastructure โ€” but from inside the house.

This is Letter A of eight. The pattern repeats across Los Angeles, New York, San Jose, and into hyperscaler territory. ColoCrossing is not unique. It is typical.

Methodology & Sources

This analysis draws from: LSN Threat Intelligence Platform (8,000+ IPs, 271K+ entity links), Cowrie SSH honeypot (active since May 2026), ARIN RDAP records, PeeringDB AS36352, AbuseIPDB, GreyNoise Community API, Shodan InternetDB, Spamhaus Botnet C&C Reports, existing investigation TI-2026-019M (Spamhaus cross-reference), campaign cluster analysis (HASSH fingerprinting). All threat scores computed from multi-source enrichment pipeline. All data verifiable through cited sources.

โš  Personal capacity. Research published independently โ€” not reflecting employer views. Derived from passive observation of attacks against personal infrastructure. Full disclaimer โ†’
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