LSN โ€” Local Sovereign Network

๐ŸŸ  CRITICAL โ€” Respectable-Front Architecture ยท Corporate Roll-Up ยท IPv4-Lease Laundering ยท 671-IP libssh2 Scanner Campaign

๐Ÿข TI-2026-020C โ€” "The Roll-Up" โ€” World Host Group / hosting.com, IPXO Leasing, and Latin-American Prefixes Wearing a US Costume

TI-2026-020C ยท Part C of 6 ยท Confidence: HIGH ยท Sources: UK Companies House, PeeringDB, RIPE RDAP, press releases, honeypot DB

๐Ÿข Executive Summary

AS14670 is country-plastic: AbuseIPDB geolocation US, GB corporate registration, and BGP-origin signals spanning AE / ZA / GB. PeeringDB now labels it hosting.com USE1 (org 36894); abuse handling fans out across worldhost.group, HostforWeb, IPXO and report@abuseradar.com, with end-tenants redacted as Private Customer.

World Host Group / hosting.com is a genuine, scaled hosting roll-up โ€” 30+ brands, ~700k customers, CEO Sebastian de Lemos, private-capital backing (Oakley Capital, Equivia Partners), UK entity WHG Hosting Services Ltd (Companies House 14644356). This is not a shell-only entity.

Yet the AS14670 address layer carries the abuse: Latin-American-looking prefixes (190.92.168.0/22, 191.96.151.0/24, 181.214.142.0/24) registered/geofed as US via IPXO records, a homogeneous root/<blank> credential pattern, and a shared libssh2_1.11.0 HASSH campaign observed across 671 IPs in 50 countries.

The honest reading: attribution lands on a scanner operator using leased/commodity hosting, while the corporate brand supplies reputation. The IPv4-lease + third-party-abuse-desk stack (IPXO โ†’ AbuseRadar โ†’ Private Customer) is precisely what makes abuse laundering frictionless.

๐Ÿงฑ The cleanest possible building, full of rooms nobody will name

World Host Group is not a shell. That is what makes it interesting. It is a genuine, private-capital-backed roll-up — thirty-odd acquired hosting brands, some 700,000 customers, a chief executive with a real name (Sebastian de Lemos), balance-sheet backing from Oakley Capital and Equivia Partners, and a UK company number you can pull up in seconds (14644356). When A2 Hosting became hosting.com in 2025, this was the machine behind the rebrand. By every conventional measure it is the respectable end of the industry.

And yet its autonomous system, AS14670, is country-plastic. Point at one of its addresses and ask the question five ways and you get five answers: a US customer geofeed, a GB corporate registry, a BGP origin flickering between the United Arab Emirates, South Africa and Britain, a Netherlands/US RDAP contact, and a block of addresses that wears the shape of Latin America. The same finger, the same instant, five jurisdictions. The corporation is real. The geography is improvised.

๐Ÿ’ธ Follow the indirection: IPXO, AbuseRadar, and the tenant called 'Private Customer'

Here is the machinery that makes abuse frictionless without anyone obviously committing it. Several of these addresses carry the RDAP organisation 'Private Customer' and route their abuse complaints to report@abuseradar.com — AbuseRadar being the dedicated complaints desk operated for IPXO, the largest IPv4 leasing marketplace. The chain is elegant: a real holder leases dormant address space; an operator rents it; the complaint travels to a neutral third-party desk; and the actual tenant disappears behind the words 'Private Customer.' Each layer is individually defensible. Stacked, they are a laundry.

IPXO's own co-founder said the quiet part in an industry post: in a single quarter of 2022 the platform handled more than 22,000 IP-abuse incidents. That is the scale of the byproduct. And riding this leased, redacted, third-party-desked address space was a single scanner identity — one shared SSH fingerprint (libssh2_1.11.0, HASSH 14b2ddda…) seen across 671 machines in 50 countries, hammering root with a blank password 24,239 times. The most damning detail is almost funny: many of the attacking hosts carry 25 unpatched CVEs of their own. The censors of the internet's doors had left their own wide open.

๐Ÿ›๏ธ The Official Scaffolding โ€” Institutional Anchors

Nothing at this scale operates without anchors in official structures — Regional Internet Registries, company registrars, state telecoms, regulators, financiers, carriers, and law enforcement. These are the documented anchors (sourced). The inferred ones live in the conspiratorial section below.

WHG is the most heavily institutionalised actor in the whole investigation, and that is the unsettling part. It is anchored in the UK Companies House and accredited as a RIPE NCC LIR; its brands sit in the ICANN registrar ecosystem; its money is regulated — Oakley Capital (overseen by Luxembourg's CSSF, present on the London market) and Equivia Partners are the documented backers. The leasing layer, IPXO, is a UK-registered company embedded in ARIN and RIPE abuse-policy discourse through co-founder Vincentas Grinius, with complaints outsourced to AbuseRadar / Internet Utilities. Even the transit is blue-chip: upstream Arelion (AS1299) carries the heritage of Telia and the backing of Swedish public-pension capital (Polhem Infra). Every anchor is real, regulated, and respectable. The abuse rides on top of all of it.

๐ŸŽฏ Actors & Entities

Actor / EntityTypeCountryRiskConf.Role
World Host Group / hosting.comhosterGBCRITICALhighGlobal hosting roll-up and flagship hosting.com brand; PeeringDB org_id 36894 appears on WHG ASNs AS14670, AS204800 and AS199404.
WHG Hosting Services LtdorgGBHIGHhighUK private limited company, company number 14644356, used in RIPE LIR records for WHG address space.
Sebastian de LemospersonGBMEDIUMhighCEO/founder figure for World Host Group and active Companies House director of WHG Hosting Services Ltd.
IPXOmarketplaceGB/LTHIGHhighIPv4 leasing, monetization and IPAM platform appearing in WHG-AS14670 WHOIS records through IPXO/netutils MNT references and incident-response contacts.
AbuseRadar / Internet UtilitiesorgunknownMEDIUMhighThird-party abuse and IP-management provider used by IPXO; abuse mailbox report@abuseradar.com appears on WHG-linked Private Customer prefixes.
Private Customer (ORG-WHGU1-RIPE)orgUSCRITICALhighRedacted end-user organization in RIPE records for several AS14670 prefixes; hides customer identity behind Private Residence and AbuseRadar mailbox.
ColoCrossing / HostPapa (AS36352)hosterUSHIGHmediumAS14670 upstream and separate large participant in the same libssh2 HASSH scanner campaign.
Oakley Capital / Equivia PartnersorgGB/DEMEDIUMmediumPrivate-capital backers named in Trustventure's WHG/A2 acquisition note.
libssh2_1.11.0 scanner operatorcriminal_groupunknownCRITICALhighUnattributed operator behind HASSH 14b2ddda386a4d1006108ccd231b42fc, observed across hundreds of IPs using root with blank password.

๐ŸŒ Infrastructure & Indicators (IOCs)

IP / IndicatorASNAS NameGeoRoleThreat
191.101.33.115AS14670WHG-USE1 - WHG Hosting ServiceUS / BGP AE / RDAP USscanner node; Private Customer98
191.101.33.110AS14670WHG-USE1 - WHG Hosting ServiceUS / BGP AE / RDAP USscanner node; Private Customer92
179.61.232.245AS14670WHG-USE1 - WHG Hosting ServiceUS / BGP AE / RDAP USscanner node; Private Customer; exposed Tomcat/Java surface91
154.16.115.17AS14670WHG-USE1 - WHG Hosting ServiceUS / BGP ZA / RDAP USscanner node; IPXO Incident Response Team88
191.101.33.114AS14670WHG-USE1 - WHG Hosting ServiceUS / BGP AE / RDAP USscanner node; Private Customer86
154.16.119.22AS14670WHG-USE1 - WHG Hosting ServiceUS / BGP ZA / RDAP NLscanner node; HostforWeb Support86
179.61.232.244AS14670WHG-USE1 - WHG Hosting ServiceUS / BGP AE / RDAP USscanner node; Private Customer83
154.16.115.163AS14670WHG-USE1 - WHG Hosting ServiceUS / BGP ZA / RDAP USscanner node; IPXO Incident Response Team72
88.135.73.205AS14670WHG-USE1 - WHG Hosting ServiceUS / BGP GB / RDAP USsuspicious campaign-linked IP50
192.250.235.126AS204800WHG-SGP - WHG Hosting ServicesSG / BGP GB / RDAP SGscanner node; WHG Hosting Services Ltd95
198.38.91.141AS204800WHG-SGP - WHG Hosting ServicesSG / BGP GB / RDAP SGscanner node; WHG Hosting Services Ltd82
192.250.235.26AS204800WHG-SGP - WHG Hosting ServicesSG / BGP GB / RDAP SGscanner node; WHG Hosting Services Ltd60
198.38.85.149AS199404WHG-IN - WHG Hosting Services IN / BGP GB / RDAP INscanner node; WHG Hosting Services Ltd91
69.57.172.212AS199404WHG-IN / RIPE NCC record discrIN / BGP GB / RDAP unknownlow-volume WHG-IN adjacent scanner IP20

Threat = composite 0โ€“100 score from honeypot activity + multi-source enrichment.

๐Ÿ”Ž Findings

SeverityConf.CategoryFinding
MEDIUMhighcorporateWHG is a legitimate scaled hosting roll-up, not a shell-only entity
Public sources show World Host Group/hosting.com serving hundreds of thousands of customers and millions of websites, with A2 Hosting, Doteasy, HostforWeb and other brands folded into a buy-and-build hosting platform.
MEDIUMmediumfinancialThe WHG/hosting.com acquisition engine has private-capital backing
Trustventure states WHG was backed by Equivia Partners and Oakley Capital in the A2/hosting.com acquisition process.
LOWhighcorporateWHG Hosting Services Ltd is a new UK LIR entity with visible directors
Companies House lists WHG Hosting Services Ltd as active, incorporated 2023-02-06, with Sebastian de Lemos and Panagiotis Kesisis as active directors during collection.
CRITICALhighgeo_discrepancyAS14670 is country-plastic: US geolocation, GB corporate registration, AE/ZA/GB BGP-origin signals
Local telemetry shows AS14670 registered as GB but observed IPs geolocate to US while Cymru/BGP country splits across AE, ZA and GB; RDAP organizations include Private Customer, IPXO Incident Response Team, HostforWeb and RIPE/WHG.
HIGHhighgeo_discrepancyLatin-American-looking prefixes are geofed or registered as US under WHG/IPXO records
Ranges such as 190.92.168.0/22, 191.96.151.0/24, 181.214.142.0/24 and 179.61.232.0/24 are announced by AS14670 while RIPE records place them in US and, for several blocks, behind IPXO/netutils Private Customer objects.
CRITICALhighcampaignThe libssh2_1.11.0 HASSH campaign is a major shared scanner fingerprint
Campaign table records 628 IPs across 48 countries, while direct session query currently sees 671 distinct IPs, 5,341 sessions and 50 countries for HASSH 14b2ddda386a4d1006108ccd231b42fc.
HIGHhighcampaignThe campaign credential pattern is homogeneous: root with blank password
Across the HASSH-linked fleet, root:<blank> was used 24,239 times across 670 IPs; within AS14670 alone, root:<blank> appears 716 times across 9 IPs.
HIGHhighinfrastructureWHG-related IPs carry unusually high Shodan vulnerability counts
Four WHG-related IPs show 25 CVEs each, one shows 19, one shows 6, and three show 3, indicating exploitable or neglected infrastructure in the same address set that attacked the honeypot.
HIGHhighinfrastructureIPXO/netutils and AbuseRadar create a third-party abuse indirection layer
WHOIS records for WHG-AS14670 prefixes point to Private Customer objects, IPXO-MNT/netutils-mnt maintainers, and report@abuseradar.com; IPXO says its abuse reports are handled by AbuseRadar.
HIGHhighfinancialIPv4 leasing monetizes dormant address space but exposes holders to abuse laundering
IPXO markets leasing, monetization, automated payouts and geolocation variety; its ARIN guest post acknowledges leased IP assets can be abused and reports tens of thousands of abuse incidents handled in Q3 2022.
MEDIUMmediuminfrastructureAS14670 sits adjacent to ColoCrossing/HostPapa in both upstream and campaign ecology
AS14670 uses AS36352 as an upstream/shared BGP edge; AS36352 is also one of the largest ASNs in the same HASSH campaign with 35 local IPs.
HIGHhighattributionThe strongest attribution is to a scanner operator using leased/commodity hosting, not to WHG corporate intent
The combined record shows WHG-addressed infrastructure in a global campaign, but no direct evidence that WHG leadership knowingly facilitated it.

๐Ÿ•ณ๏ธ The Conspiratorial Read โ€” Questions & Calibrated Answers

Each answer states what the evidence supports and labels where a claim is unproven. Questions are instruments: they pry loose the partial truths the flat record hides.

โ“ What if World Host Group knowingly sells bulletproof service behind a clean brand?

The evidence does not support that claim and we do not make it (confidence HIGH on the limit). What the data proves is structural: a roll-up of 30+ acquired brands, leased IPv4, redacted end-users and third-party abuse desks creates opacity in which abusive tenants are hard to attribute โ€” independent of corporate intent.

โ“ Why do Latin-American IP ranges show up as 'US'?

Because registration country is a paperwork choice, not a physical fact. Under IPXO/WHG records the prefixes are geofed and registered as US while their legacy/real footprint is Latin-American. The 'US' label buys reputation and routing; it is the geo-discrepancy fingerprint in its purest leased form.

โ“ Who actually profits from IPv4 leasing โ€” and what does it hide?

IPXO and similar marketplaces monetize dormant IPv4 blocks for holders. The byproduct is an indirection layer: the lessor collects rent, the lessee operates, and abuse complaints route to a neutral desk (AbuseRadar) that shields the tenant. The 'Private Customer' RDAP value is the hidden party.

โ“ Is the 671-IP campaign one operator renting across 50 countries?

A single shared HASSH (libssh2_1.11.0) across 671 IPs in 50 countries with an identical root/<blank> credential pattern is consistent with one toolkit/operator distributed across leased and commodity hosting โ€” exactly what the lease economy enables. We hold this at HIGH confidence for the fingerprint, MEDIUM for single-operator identity.

โ“ If WHG is legitimate, regulated and pension-funded, why has no one acted on the 671-IP scanner campaign living in its space?

Because there is no single culprit to act against (INFERRED / documented negative: no law-enforcement or sanctions action was found). Legitimate registry membership, private-equity ownership and leased-IP indirection combine into an abuse-laundering surface — a structure where responsibility is so distributed that enforcement has nowhere to land. The opacity is emergent, not necessarily intended.

โ“ Follow the money to its source &mdash; whose savings are underneath this?

Private equity (Oakley, Equivia) and pension-fund-backed transit (Arelion via Polhem). Stated plainly: infrastructure financed by ordinary retirement capital is carrying a global credential-scanning campaign. Not through conspiracy — through the sheer ordinariness of how the money is structured.

๐Ÿ”— Linked Dossiers

๐Ÿ“Ž Sources & Evidence Chain (23 items)

Every claim above is anchored to a primary source. Full machine-readable evidence in Postgres dossier_intel (investigation 019M).

TypeEvidenceReliabilitySource
technicalLocal ASN dossier: AS14670 WHG-USE1highlocal:sec_intel_asn_dossier/14670
technicalLocal ASN dossier: AS204800 WHG-SGPhighlocal:sec_intel_asn_dossier/204800
technicalLocal ASN dossier: AS199404 WHG-INhighlocal:sec_intel_asn_dossier/199404
technicalLocal IP census for WHG ASNshighlocal:sec_intel_query/whg_ip_census
honeypotLocal HASSH campaign queryhighlocal:honeypot_fingerprints/campaigns
honeypotLocal credential query for libssh2 campaignhighlocal:honeypot_credentials/hassh_14b2
technicalLocal recon/service query for WHG IPshighlocal:discovered_services/whg_asns
technicalLocal Shodan vulnerability counts for WHG IPshighlocal:ips.shodan_vulns/whg_asns
whoisRIPE WHOIS 191.96.151.0/24 Private Customer via IPXOhighhttps://docs.db.ripe.net/
whoisRIPE WHOIS 179.61.232.0/24 Private Customer via IPXOhighhttps://docs.db.ripe.net/
whoisRIPE WHOIS 190.92.168.0/22 WHG geofeed UShighhttps://docs.db.ripe.net/
newsHosting.com / World Host Group rebrand press releasemediumhttps://ktla.com/business/press-releases/cision/20250507DA82375/a2-hos
newsDoteasy acquisition press releasemediumhttps://www.newsfilecorp.com/release/187486/World-Host-Group-Acquires-
newsHosting.com interview: >30 brands, 900+ staff, 2.5M websitesmediumhttps://webhosting.today/2025/05/06/hosting-com-the-story-behind-a-glo
financialTrustventure acquisition note: WHG backed by Equivia and Oakleymediumhttps://trustventure.de/en/trustventure-advised-world-host-group-in-th
corporateCompanies House WHG Hosting Services Ltdhighhttps://find-and-update.company-information.service.gov.uk/company/146
osintIPXO homepage: IP leasing and monetizationmediumhttps://www.ipxo.com/
osintIPXO abuse report page names AbuseRadarmediumhttps://www.ipxo.com/report-abuse/
osintARIN guest post by IPXO on lease market abusemediumhttps://www.arin.net/blog/2022/11/17/ipxo-ip-address-abuse/
osintAbuseRadar homepagemediumhttps://www.abuseradar.com/
osintSpamhaus on bulletproof-hosting facilitatorshighhttps://www.spamhaus.org/resource-hub/bulletproof-hosting/bulletproof-
osintSpamhaus on provider/customer verification and resellershighhttps://www.spamhaus.org/resource-hub/botnet-c-c/networks-hosting-botn
technicalLocal AS14670 upstream/shared BGP linkshighlocal:sec_intel_asn_dossier/14670.entity_links
Methodology: UK Companies House public API (14644356) ยท PeeringDB org 36894 ยท RIPE RDAP for AS14670/204800/199404 + member prefixes ยท public press/acquisition releases ยท Cowrie HASSH + credential correlation ยท No active scanning beyond honeypot-side recon already on record.
โš  Personal capacity. Research published independently โ€” not reflecting employer views. Derived from passive observation of attacks against personal infrastructure. Full disclaimer โ†’
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