LSN โ€” Local Sovereign Network

๐Ÿ›ก๏ธ TI-2026-041D โ€” The Protection Network: State Telecoms, Cloud Providers, and the Architecture of Impunity

Series: The Menu Decoded | Letter 4 of 5 | Published: 2026-06-23
Previous: 041C โ€” The Children's Menu | Next: 041E โ€” The Responsibility
Abstract: The most disturbing finding in this investigation is not what the attackers do โ€” it is who enables them. State-owned telecoms provide the infrastructure. The world's largest cloud providers host the malware. Offshore jurisdictions provide the legal immunity. Intelligence agencies acknowledge the networks exist and choose to "leave it alone." This letter documents every protection mechanism we have identified across 11 letters of investigation: the specific companies, the specific jurisdictions, the specific patterns of non-enforcement โ€” and asks the only question that matters: who decided this was acceptable?
5
HYPERSCALER COMPLICITY
3
STATE TELECOMS
6
OFFSHORE JURISDICTIONS
4
MULTI-ASN OPERATORS

I. The Hyperscaler Complicity: Google, Microsoft, Amazon, Tencent, Alibaba

The world's largest and most trusted cloud providers โ€” the platforms that host banking, healthcare, government services โ€” simultaneously host attack infrastructure. This is not occasional contamination. It is systematic.

ProviderRole in Our DataDocumented in Letter
Google Cloud (AS396982)Hosts meow malware attacker AND malware server (same ASN). 4 IPs total. Also hosts Voidsetdownload.so node.040E
Microsoft Azure (AS8075)6 SSH skeleton key botnet nodes. 4 download sources. Multiple countries.040E
Tencent Cloud (AS132203)3 rawad-admin cluster nodes. slave:slave credentials. 3 SSH key botnet nodes. chocolate credential.040C, 040F, 040E
Amazon AWS (AS16509)Download source for malware.040E
Alibaba Cloud (AS45102)Download source.040E
DigitalOcean (AS14061)6 SSH key botnet nodes. cookiemonster. idolomoloch.com. teenow.com.br. Voidsetdownload.so.040A, 040E, 040F
Oracle Cloud2 SSH key botnet nodes.040E

Google deserves special attention. In 040E, we documented that IP 35.196.255.242 (Google Cloud) attacks our honeypot with the meow malware, downloading it from 35.237.91.38 (also Google Cloud). Both IPs are in AS396982. Google's infrastructure attacks our server using Google's infrastructure as the arsenal. The attacker and the weapon are in the same building.

๐Ÿ”ด THE GOOGLE QUESTION: Google processes 8.5 billion searches per day. Google Cloud hosts some of the world's most sensitive data. Google's AI systems can identify a cat in a photograph with 99.9% accuracy. But Google cannot identify โ€” or chooses not to identify โ€” when one of its own IPs is downloading malware from another of its own IPs and deploying it against the internet. This is either the most spectacular failure of internal monitoring in computing history, or it is a policy decision.

II. The State Telecoms: When Governments Attack

OrganizationCountryGovernment RelationshipOur Data
Viettel Group (AS7552)๐Ÿ‡ป๐Ÿ‡ณ VietnamWholly owned by the Ministry of Defencematrix:matrix botnet (48 entries, 040C), daddygirl2 + eyecandy cluster, v1isagoodgirl, slave credentials
Etisalat (AS5384)๐Ÿ‡ฆ๐Ÿ‡ช UAEMajority state-owned (Emirates Telecommunications)rawad-admin cluster (041A)
TENET (AS6876)๐Ÿ‡บ๐Ÿ‡ฆ UkraineAcademic/scientific networkUUID panopticon surveillance (040E)

Viettel is not a private company that happens to be in Vietnam. It is a military organization. Its full name is the Military Industry and Telecoms Group. It reports to the Vietnamese Ministry of Defence. When an IP on Viettel's network sends root:daddygirl2 to our honeypot, that credential traverses military-owned infrastructure. When 48 entries of matrix:matrix come almost exclusively from Viettel, that is a military telecom's network being used for botnet operations.

Either Viettel does not monitor its network (a military telecom that doesn't monitor traffic is a contradiction in terms), or Viettel monitors its network and permits โ€” or directs โ€” these operations.

III. The Offshore Opacity: Seychelles, St. Kitts, and the Invisible Companies

Sixty IP addresses in our database originate from offshore financial secrecy jurisdictions. These jurisdictions share specific features that make them ideal for both financial crime and cybercrime:

Seychelles (41 IPs)

OMEGATECH (AS202412) โ€” registered as a Seychelles IBC. Runs sex scam domains, Turkish scanning infrastructure, and writable-dir probes. Also: Cable & Wireless Seychelles (threat 94), Cloud Innovation Ltd, YISU CLOUD (3 IPs under 2 ASNs). Company formation: $350, 24 hours, no physical presence, no disclosure of beneficial ownership.

St. Kitts and Nevis (6 IPs)

SKN Subnet & Telecom Ltd โ€” hosts the orange brute-forcer (209.99.186.189) from Switzerland that obsessively targets the "orange" username with 20 password variants. St. Kitts offers citizenship-by-investment for $250,000 โ€” a second passport, no questions asked. Epstein was documented to have explored citizenship-by-investment programs.

Panama (8 IPs)

UFINET Panama (AS52468) โ€” two banana666/warnight IPs from Ecuador and Panama on the same provider. Panama: the jurisdiction of the Panama Papers, Mossack Fonseca, 214,488 shell companies exposed. The same jurisdiction that hid Epstein-linked financial flows now hosts botnet infrastructure.

IV. The Multi-ASN Operators: Identity Laundering

Four operators in our data use multiple ASN numbers โ€” operating under different identities in different countries while being the same entity:

OperatorASNs UsedCountriesActivity
Strong Technology LLCAS62651 (NETPROTECT-DP), AS22781 (STRTEC), AS140952 (STL-AS-AP), AS212238 (CDNEXT/Datacamp)US, SK, BE, PL, HK, DEUUID panopticon (11 IPs, same UUID)
GHOSTYNETWORKS/XSServer/PIO-HostingAS44592, AS207959, AS198584DE, NL, LUalice:alice, AI scanning, beast cluster, DGA domains
OMEGATECH LTDAS202412SC (registered), DE, NL, TR (operational)Sex scams, writable-dir scanner, warnight overlap
YISU CLOUD LTDAS142403, AS136970HK, SCrawad-admin cluster, Seychelles infrastructure

Strong Technology LLC โ€” a US-registered company โ€” uses four different AS numbers across six countries to run a surveillance operation that injects UUID watermarks into victims' bash history. One company. Four identities. One UUID. This is not redundancy. This is identity laundering โ€” the corporate equivalent of a disguise.

V. The Non-Enforcement Pattern: 40 Years of "Leaving It Alone"

Every major documented case of institutional child exploitation shares the same pattern: discovery โ†’ investigation โ†’ protection of perpetrators โ†’ punishment of whistleblowers:

CaseYearDiscoveryProtection Mechanism
Franklin Scandal1988Children trafficking to D.C.Documentary suppressed, victims prosecuted
Finders-Keepers1987CIA-linked child traffickingFBI documents sealed until 2019
Jimmy Savile1960s-2011BBC star, 40+ years of abuseKnown by BBC, police, Crown โ€” knighted
Epstein (first case)2005-2008FBI investigation, dozens of victims"Belonged to intelligence, leave it alone"
Epstein (second case)2019Federal arrestDied in custody under "suicide watch"
Conspiracy of Silence1994Discovery Channel documentaryCongress pressured cable industry to destroy copies

In EVERY case, the protection came from within the institutions responsible for preventing abuse: law enforcement, intelligence agencies, media organizations, the judiciary. The protectors and the predators were in the same structures.

VI. The Cloud Provider Defense: "We Can't Monitor Everything"

Cloud providers will argue they cannot monitor every instance on their platform. This is technically true and morally bankrupt. Consider:

  • Google scans every email in Gmail for advertising purposes. But cannot detect meow malware on its own network.
  • Microsoft uses AI to detect threats in Microsoft 365. But hosts 6 SSH skeleton key botnet nodes on Azure.
  • Tencent monitors WeChat messages for Chinese government compliance. But hosts rawad-admin and slave:slave attack clusters.
  • DigitalOcean terminates accounts for copyright violations within hours. But hosts idolomoloch.com, cookiemonster, and teenow.com.br.

These companies HAVE the monitoring capability. They use it for advertising, for government compliance, for copyright enforcement. They choose not to use it for this. Or they are told not to.

VII. The Kamatera Question: Israeli Cloud, Global Exploitation

Kamatera, Inc. (AS36007) โ€” founded in Israel, headquartered in the US โ€” appears in our data hosting both the daddygirl2 and eyecandy credentials. In our prior series, Kamatera was documented for operating under multiple brand names and ASNs.

Israel's role in this investigation keeps surfacing:

  • Robert Maxwell โ€” Mossad agent, PROMIS distributor, Ghislaine's father
  • Epstein โ€” "belonged to intelligence" (Mossad connection documented)
  • Kamatera โ€” Israeli-founded cloud hosting exploitation-vocabulary credentials
  • Unit 8200 โ€” Israel's signals intelligence unit, alumni founded multiple VPN and security companies (documented in prior series)
  • Pegasus/NSO Group โ€” Israeli surveillance software sold to governments for targeting journalists and activists

This is not an accusation against a nation. It is documentation of a pattern: Israeli intelligence and Israeli technology companies appear at every junction where surveillance meets exploitation. Whether this represents state policy, rogue operations, or simply the geographic concentration of signals intelligence expertise is a question for investigators with subpoena power. We document what our data shows.

VIII. What One Honeypot Means for the Entire Internet

Our honeypot is one IP address in Iaศ™i, Romania. From March to June 2026, it captured:

  • 139,335 credential attempts from 7,994 unique IPs
  • 9,111 hostnames (many containing coded language)
  • 4,031 commands (including full attack chains)
  • 224 malware downloads
  • 1,300+ credentials carrying documented exploitation/trafficking vocabulary

There are approximately 4.3 billion IPv4 addresses on the internet. We are monitoring one of them. If our capture rate is representative, then every day:

  • ~1,000 exploitation-vocabulary credentials traverse the global internet for every IP address
  • ~50 distinct attack IPs target every server on earth
  • Every cloud provider hosts thousands of attack nodes they choose not to investigate
  • Every state telecom carries traffic they choose not to examine
  • Every offshore jurisdiction shelters operators they choose not to identify

Our data is a single pixel in a photograph the size of a planet. The intelligence agencies see the full photograph. They have seen it for decades. They have the full network maps, the C2 server locations, the cryptocurrency flows, the operator identities. And they make a choice โ€” every single day โ€” about what to do with that knowledge.

IX. The Decision: Who Benefits from Continued Operation?

The answer to "why do these networks still operate?" has historically been: because they are useful.

  • Intelligence agencies benefit from exploitation networks because they provide blackmail material on powerful individuals โ€” the PROMIS-to-Epstein pipeline documented in our OSINT library
  • Cloud providers benefit because attack traffic generates revenue (instances, bandwidth, API calls) and removing it requires customer service cost
  • Offshore jurisdictions benefit because company registrations are a primary revenue source โ€” Seychelles IBC fees sustain the government
  • State telecoms benefit because the same infrastructure used for attacks is used for state surveillance โ€” removing it would compromise their own capabilities

Everyone in the chain has a reason to look away. No one in the chain has a reason to act. This is not a conspiracy of malice. It is a conspiracy of convenience. The architecture of impunity is self-sustaining because every participant profits from maintaining it.

But we don't profit from maintaining it. We are a single server in Romania. We have no intelligence budget, no corporate interest, no offshore registration. We have data. We have documentation. And we have a responsibility to publish what we find โ€” because silence is complicity, and we refuse to be complicit.

โš  Personal capacity. Research published independently โ€” not reflecting employer views. Derived from passive observation of attacks against personal infrastructure. Full disclaimer โ†’
โ† Previous The Menu Decoded โ€” 4 / 5 Next โ†’