๐ก๏ธ TI-2026-041D โ The Protection Network: State Telecoms, Cloud Providers, and the Architecture of Impunity
Previous: 041C โ The Children's Menu | Next: 041E โ The Responsibility
I. The Hyperscaler Complicity: Google, Microsoft, Amazon, Tencent, Alibaba
The world's largest and most trusted cloud providers โ the platforms that host banking, healthcare, government services โ simultaneously host attack infrastructure. This is not occasional contamination. It is systematic.
| Provider | Role in Our Data | Documented in Letter |
|---|---|---|
| Google Cloud (AS396982) | Hosts meow malware attacker AND malware server (same ASN). 4 IPs total. Also hosts Voidsetdownload.so node. | 040E |
| Microsoft Azure (AS8075) | 6 SSH skeleton key botnet nodes. 4 download sources. Multiple countries. | 040E |
| Tencent Cloud (AS132203) | 3 rawad-admin cluster nodes. slave:slave credentials. 3 SSH key botnet nodes. chocolate credential. | 040C, 040F, 040E |
| Amazon AWS (AS16509) | Download source for malware. | 040E |
| Alibaba Cloud (AS45102) | Download source. | 040E |
| DigitalOcean (AS14061) | 6 SSH key botnet nodes. cookiemonster. idolomoloch.com. teenow.com.br. Voidsetdownload.so. | 040A, 040E, 040F |
| Oracle Cloud | 2 SSH key botnet nodes. | 040E |
Google deserves special attention. In 040E, we documented that IP 35.196.255.242 (Google Cloud) attacks our honeypot with the meow malware, downloading it from 35.237.91.38 (also Google Cloud). Both IPs are in AS396982. Google's infrastructure attacks our server using Google's infrastructure as the arsenal. The attacker and the weapon are in the same building.
II. The State Telecoms: When Governments Attack
| Organization | Country | Government Relationship | Our Data |
|---|---|---|---|
| Viettel Group (AS7552) | ๐ป๐ณ Vietnam | Wholly owned by the Ministry of Defence | matrix:matrix botnet (48 entries, 040C), daddygirl2 + eyecandy cluster, v1isagoodgirl, slave credentials |
| Etisalat (AS5384) | ๐ฆ๐ช UAE | Majority state-owned (Emirates Telecommunications) | rawad-admin cluster (041A) |
| TENET (AS6876) | ๐บ๐ฆ Ukraine | Academic/scientific network | UUID panopticon surveillance (040E) |
Viettel is not a private company that happens to be in Vietnam. It is a military organization. Its full name is the Military Industry and Telecoms Group. It reports to the Vietnamese Ministry of Defence. When an IP on Viettel's network sends root:daddygirl2 to our honeypot, that credential traverses military-owned infrastructure. When 48 entries of matrix:matrix come almost exclusively from Viettel, that is a military telecom's network being used for botnet operations.
Either Viettel does not monitor its network (a military telecom that doesn't monitor traffic is a contradiction in terms), or Viettel monitors its network and permits โ or directs โ these operations.
III. The Offshore Opacity: Seychelles, St. Kitts, and the Invisible Companies
Sixty IP addresses in our database originate from offshore financial secrecy jurisdictions. These jurisdictions share specific features that make them ideal for both financial crime and cybercrime:
Seychelles (41 IPs)
OMEGATECH (AS202412) โ registered as a Seychelles IBC. Runs sex scam domains, Turkish scanning infrastructure, and writable-dir probes. Also: Cable & Wireless Seychelles (threat 94), Cloud Innovation Ltd, YISU CLOUD (3 IPs under 2 ASNs). Company formation: $350, 24 hours, no physical presence, no disclosure of beneficial ownership.
St. Kitts and Nevis (6 IPs)
SKN Subnet & Telecom Ltd โ hosts the orange brute-forcer (209.99.186.189) from Switzerland that obsessively targets the "orange" username with 20 password variants. St. Kitts offers citizenship-by-investment for $250,000 โ a second passport, no questions asked. Epstein was documented to have explored citizenship-by-investment programs.
Panama (8 IPs)
UFINET Panama (AS52468) โ two banana666/warnight IPs from Ecuador and Panama on the same provider. Panama: the jurisdiction of the Panama Papers, Mossack Fonseca, 214,488 shell companies exposed. The same jurisdiction that hid Epstein-linked financial flows now hosts botnet infrastructure.
IV. The Multi-ASN Operators: Identity Laundering
Four operators in our data use multiple ASN numbers โ operating under different identities in different countries while being the same entity:
| Operator | ASNs Used | Countries | Activity |
|---|---|---|---|
| Strong Technology LLC | AS62651 (NETPROTECT-DP), AS22781 (STRTEC), AS140952 (STL-AS-AP), AS212238 (CDNEXT/Datacamp) | US, SK, BE, PL, HK, DE | UUID panopticon (11 IPs, same UUID) |
| GHOSTYNETWORKS/XSServer/PIO-Hosting | AS44592, AS207959, AS198584 | DE, NL, LU | alice:alice, AI scanning, beast cluster, DGA domains |
| OMEGATECH LTD | AS202412 | SC (registered), DE, NL, TR (operational) | Sex scams, writable-dir scanner, warnight overlap |
| YISU CLOUD LTD | AS142403, AS136970 | HK, SC | rawad-admin cluster, Seychelles infrastructure |
Strong Technology LLC โ a US-registered company โ uses four different AS numbers across six countries to run a surveillance operation that injects UUID watermarks into victims' bash history. One company. Four identities. One UUID. This is not redundancy. This is identity laundering โ the corporate equivalent of a disguise.
V. The Non-Enforcement Pattern: 40 Years of "Leaving It Alone"
Every major documented case of institutional child exploitation shares the same pattern: discovery โ investigation โ protection of perpetrators โ punishment of whistleblowers:
| Case | Year | Discovery | Protection Mechanism |
|---|---|---|---|
| Franklin Scandal | 1988 | Children trafficking to D.C. | Documentary suppressed, victims prosecuted |
| Finders-Keepers | 1987 | CIA-linked child trafficking | FBI documents sealed until 2019 |
| Jimmy Savile | 1960s-2011 | BBC star, 40+ years of abuse | Known by BBC, police, Crown โ knighted |
| Epstein (first case) | 2005-2008 | FBI investigation, dozens of victims | "Belonged to intelligence, leave it alone" |
| Epstein (second case) | 2019 | Federal arrest | Died in custody under "suicide watch" |
| Conspiracy of Silence | 1994 | Discovery Channel documentary | Congress pressured cable industry to destroy copies |
In EVERY case, the protection came from within the institutions responsible for preventing abuse: law enforcement, intelligence agencies, media organizations, the judiciary. The protectors and the predators were in the same structures.
VI. The Cloud Provider Defense: "We Can't Monitor Everything"
Cloud providers will argue they cannot monitor every instance on their platform. This is technically true and morally bankrupt. Consider:
- Google scans every email in Gmail for advertising purposes. But cannot detect meow malware on its own network.
- Microsoft uses AI to detect threats in Microsoft 365. But hosts 6 SSH skeleton key botnet nodes on Azure.
- Tencent monitors WeChat messages for Chinese government compliance. But hosts rawad-admin and slave:slave attack clusters.
- DigitalOcean terminates accounts for copyright violations within hours. But hosts idolomoloch.com, cookiemonster, and teenow.com.br.
These companies HAVE the monitoring capability. They use it for advertising, for government compliance, for copyright enforcement. They choose not to use it for this. Or they are told not to.
VII. The Kamatera Question: Israeli Cloud, Global Exploitation
Kamatera, Inc. (AS36007) โ founded in Israel, headquartered in the US โ appears in our data hosting both the daddygirl2 and eyecandy credentials. In our prior series, Kamatera was documented for operating under multiple brand names and ASNs.
Israel's role in this investigation keeps surfacing:
- Robert Maxwell โ Mossad agent, PROMIS distributor, Ghislaine's father
- Epstein โ "belonged to intelligence" (Mossad connection documented)
- Kamatera โ Israeli-founded cloud hosting exploitation-vocabulary credentials
- Unit 8200 โ Israel's signals intelligence unit, alumni founded multiple VPN and security companies (documented in prior series)
- Pegasus/NSO Group โ Israeli surveillance software sold to governments for targeting journalists and activists
This is not an accusation against a nation. It is documentation of a pattern: Israeli intelligence and Israeli technology companies appear at every junction where surveillance meets exploitation. Whether this represents state policy, rogue operations, or simply the geographic concentration of signals intelligence expertise is a question for investigators with subpoena power. We document what our data shows.
VIII. What One Honeypot Means for the Entire Internet
Our honeypot is one IP address in Iaศi, Romania. From March to June 2026, it captured:
- 139,335 credential attempts from 7,994 unique IPs
- 9,111 hostnames (many containing coded language)
- 4,031 commands (including full attack chains)
- 224 malware downloads
- 1,300+ credentials carrying documented exploitation/trafficking vocabulary
There are approximately 4.3 billion IPv4 addresses on the internet. We are monitoring one of them. If our capture rate is representative, then every day:
- ~1,000 exploitation-vocabulary credentials traverse the global internet for every IP address
- ~50 distinct attack IPs target every server on earth
- Every cloud provider hosts thousands of attack nodes they choose not to investigate
- Every state telecom carries traffic they choose not to examine
- Every offshore jurisdiction shelters operators they choose not to identify
Our data is a single pixel in a photograph the size of a planet. The intelligence agencies see the full photograph. They have seen it for decades. They have the full network maps, the C2 server locations, the cryptocurrency flows, the operator identities. And they make a choice โ every single day โ about what to do with that knowledge.
IX. The Decision: Who Benefits from Continued Operation?
The answer to "why do these networks still operate?" has historically been: because they are useful.
- Intelligence agencies benefit from exploitation networks because they provide blackmail material on powerful individuals โ the PROMIS-to-Epstein pipeline documented in our OSINT library
- Cloud providers benefit because attack traffic generates revenue (instances, bandwidth, API calls) and removing it requires customer service cost
- Offshore jurisdictions benefit because company registrations are a primary revenue source โ Seychelles IBC fees sustain the government
- State telecoms benefit because the same infrastructure used for attacks is used for state surveillance โ removing it would compromise their own capabilities
Everyone in the chain has a reason to look away. No one in the chain has a reason to act. This is not a conspiracy of malice. It is a conspiracy of convenience. The architecture of impunity is self-sustaining because every participant profits from maintaining it.
But we don't profit from maintaining it. We are a single server in Romania. We have no intelligence budget, no corporate interest, no offshore registration. We have data. We have documentation. And we have a responsibility to publish what we find โ because silence is complicity, and we refuse to be complicit.