๐ณ๏ธ TI-2026-020B โ "ISAEV" โ A Brand-New Kazakh-Named /24, Routed From Russia, Geolocated to Poland, Hosting Darknet-Market Mirrors
๐ณ๏ธ Executive Summary
AS200730 โ registered to a named individual, Igor Isaev (Kazakhstan), allocated by RIPE on 2026-02-20, a single /24 (87.251.64.0/24) โ is a textbook offshore-shell bulletproof host. RIR registration says KZ, Team Cymru BGP-origin says RU, AbuseIPDB geolocation says PL.
The abuse contact is abuse@novahost.kz; the RIPE maintainer is ru-avm-1-mnt โ a Russian object linked to Aleksei Balalaev โ binding the Kazakh identity to Russian operations.
87.251.64.176 alone produced 4,016 honeypot hits with 3,782 successful logins (admin/admin), a Go SSH scanner/credential-validator. On the adjacent 87.251.64.146, passive DNS resolves mirrors branded for Torzon, Abacus, DrugHub and Kerberos darknet markets.
This is the same darknet-on-bulletproof pattern documented for w1n Ltd in TI-019K โ two unrelated geo-discrepant operations, both hosting marketplace frontends.
๐ชช A man who may not exist, and a company that barely does
The paperwork says his name is Igor Isaev — on the inetnum object, Isaev Igor Maratovich — and that he lives in Almaty, Kazakhstan. On 20 February 2026 the RIPE registry handed his autonomous system, AS200730, a single block of 256 addresses. Seventeen days earlier, on 3 February, someone had registered the domain that would become his abuse contact, novahost.kz. Visit it today and you find no company. You find the default page Plesk shows before a human has done anything — behind a self-signed certificate that expired on 4 November 2023, years before the domain it secures was even created. It is a storefront with the plastic still on the furniture, and a clock on the wall that runs backwards.
This is what a liability sink looks like. For roughly €130 a year, a registrar called Via-Registry will conjure a fresh autonomous system under a natural person's name — it advertises having done so more than a hundred times. The named individual absorbs the abuse complaints. The operator stays behind the curtain. And the curtain, in this case, is stitched in Russia: the network's maintainer object, ru-avm-1-mnt, belongs to one Aleksei Balalaev of Startovaya 7A, Novosibirsk — the same maintainer that quietly stands behind another Kazakh 'individual' AS, AS212835, registered to a different name entirely. One Russian hand, several Kazakh masks.
๐ What lives at .146, and what hammers from .176
The block does two jobs, on two addresses, and the division of labour is the whole story. At 87.251.64.146 the passive-DNS record blooms with names that anyone who has read a takedown press release will recognise on sight: torzon4kv5sw….top, abacus….shop, drughub….top, kerberos-darknet.link. Torzon. Abacus. DrugHub. Kerberos. These are not random strings — they are the brand names of darknet drug marketplaces. Abacus vanished in a suspected exit scam in July 2025; DrugHub rose as a successor after the Archetyp marketplace was taken down in June 2025. To find their mirror domains co-resolving on a fresh Kazakh /24 is to find the back door of an economy that the headlines said was being dismantled.
And at 87.251.64.176, the engine room: 4,016 honeypot hits, 3,782 of them successful logins, almost all with the credential admin/admin, each session lasting under a second, and — this is the eerie part — no payload at all. Nothing was installed. Nothing was stolen. The machine logs in, confirms it can, and leaves. That is not burglary; it is a census. Something is methodically validating which doors in the world will open to the most obvious key, building a ledger of access that is itself the product. The honeypot was never the target. It was a tally mark.
๐๏ธ The Official Scaffolding โ Institutional Anchors
Nothing at this scale operates without anchors in official structures — Regional Internet Registries, company registrars, state telecoms, regulators, financiers, carriers, and law enforcement. These are the documented anchors (sourced). The inferred ones live in the conspiratorial section below.
Trace ISAEV's anchors and the 'lone Kazakh' dissolves into a lattice of official bodies. RIPE NCC allocated AS200730; the sponsoring LIR runs through the broker Via-Registry / VIRTUA SYSTEMS SAS in France. The Russian maintainer ru-avm — Aleksei Balalaev's LLC 'STK' — is itself a registered RIPE object. NovaHost.kz is incorporated through KazNIC (registrar ICPS), and its nameservers ride JSC Kazakhtelecom (AS9198), Kazakhstan's state telecom — an official carrier underneath a darknet-adjacent façade. The upstream MEVSPACE peers at IXPs with Cogent, Arelion and Hurricane Electric and is flagged in the Tor Project's ISP guidance; its sibling AS210558 (1337 Services / RDP.sh) carries documented adjacency to Operation Talent, the DOJ/FBI/Europol/BKA action. And the marketplace brands on .146 sit inside an active enforcement field: Archetyp fell to Operation Deep Sentinel (BKA/Europol/Eurojust); the Garantex/Grinex exchange rails were hit by OFAC and DOJ sanctions. The money moves through BitPay, PayPal and the crypto processor Cryptomus.
๐ฏ Actors & Entities
| Actor / Entity | Type | Country | Risk | Conf. | Role |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Igor Isaev / Isaev Igor Maratovich | person | KZ | HIGH | medium | Named RIPE registrant for AS200730/ORG-II235-RIPE and 87.251.64.0/24 role objects; independent corroboration beyond RIPE was not found. |
| ISAEV / AS200730 | hoster | KZ | CRITICAL | high | Fresh single-/24 ASN with high abuse density, country-source discrepancy, and darknet passive-DNS exposure. |
| NovaHost.kz | hoster | KZ | HIGH | medium | Abuse-contact/admin domain for AS200730; observed as default Plesk site with expired self-signed certificate and GoodHost DNS. |
| ru-avm-1-mnt / Aleksei Balalaev | org | RU | HIGH | high | Russian RIPE maintainer on AS200730 inetnum and AS212835 objects; administered by Aleksei Balalaev in Novosibirsk per RIPE. |
| Via-Registry | org | FR | MEDIUM | high | RIPE maintainer/sponsorship broker appearing on AS200730; advertises fast ASN registration from โฌ130/year. |
| MEVSPACE sp. z o.o. / AS201814 | hoster | PL | MEDIUM | high | Primary upstream in local BGP graph and RIPE import/export object; crypto-friendly hosting provider with local AS risk score 85.5. |
| 1337 Services GmbH / RDP.sh / AS210558 | hoster | DE | MEDIUM | medium | ASN clustered with AS200730 via shared BGP upstream; RDP.sh advertises cheap RDP/KVM VPS, Poland locations, and cryptocurrency payments including Monero. |
| Unknown darknet-market mirror/phishing operator | criminal_group | โ | CRITICAL | medium | Unattributed operator behind Torzon/Abacus/DrugHub/Kerberos-branded passive-DNS domains resolving to 87.251.64.146. |
| Unknown Go SSH scanner operator | criminal_group | โ | CRITICAL | medium | Operator of SSH-2.0-Go HASSH cluster using admin/admin against honeypots from 87.251.64.176 and related IPs. |
๐ Infrastructure & Indicators (IOCs)
| IP / Indicator | ASN | AS Name | Geo | Role | Threat |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
87.251.64.176 | AS200730 | ISAEV - ISAEV Igor, KZ | PL/RU/KZ discrepancy | bruteforce | 99 |
87.251.64.146 | AS200730 | ISAEV - ISAEV Igor, KZ | PL/RU/KZ discrepancy | darknet_host | 49 |
87.251.64.150 | AS200730 | ISAEV - ISAEV Igor, KZ | PL/RU/KZ discrepancy | scanner | 49.2 |
87.251.64.144 | AS200730 | ISAEV - ISAEV Igor, KZ | PL/RU/KZ discrepancy | scanner | 53 |
87.251.64.145 | AS200730 | ISAEV - ISAEV Igor, KZ | PL/RU/KZ discrepancy | scanner | 48 |
87.251.64.147 | AS200730 | ISAEV - ISAEV Igor, KZ | PL/RU/KZ discrepancy | scanner | 48 |
87.251.64.149 | AS200730 | ISAEV - ISAEV Igor, KZ | PL/RU/KZ discrepancy | scanner | 48 |
87.251.64.141 | AS200730 | ISAEV - ISAEV Igor, KZ | PL/RU/KZ discrepancy | scanner | 48 |
Threat = composite 0โ100 score from honeypot activity + multi-source enrichment.
๐ Findings
| Severity | Conf. | Category | Finding |
|---|---|---|---|
| HIGH | high | geo_discrepancy | Three-country registration/routing/geolocation split AS200730 combines KZ ASN registration, PL RIPE inetnum/geolocation, and RU Team Cymru/prefix-origin evidence in the local store. |
| MEDIUM | medium | attribution | Igor Isaev identity is registered but weakly corroborated RIPE names ISAEV Igor/Isaev Igor Maratovich with an Almaty address, but public business footprint is thin and NovaHost is a default Plesk page. |
| HIGH | high | infrastructure | Fresh single-/24 ASN with high abuse density AS200730 was allocated in February 2026 and announces one /24; local telemetry sees eight active IPs and more than 4,000 honeypot attempts. |
| CRITICAL | high | behavior | 87.251.64.176 is automated SSH scanner/credential validator The node produced thousands of successful admin/admin SSH logins with SSH-2.0-Go HASSH and sub-second sessions; GreyNoise marks it as malicious scanner. |
| CRITICAL | medium | darknet | 87.251.64.146 resolves multiple darknet-market-branded domains OTX passive DNS links .146 to Torzon, Abacus, DrugHub, and Kerberos-branded domains. |
| HIGH | high | infrastructure | Russian maintainer links the KZ identity to Russian RIPE operations The inetnum uses ru-avm-1-mnt, administered by a Novosibirsk contact; AS212835 shows a repeated KZ-individual ASN pattern under the same maintainer. |
| MEDIUM | medium | financial | Low-cost ASN and crypto-friendly upstream ecosystem lower abuse friction Via-Registry advertises ASN registration from โฌ130/year; MEVSPACE and RDP.sh offer crypto-friendly hosting/VPS services around the routing neighborhood. |
| MEDIUM | medium | infrastructure | AS201814 upstream and AS210558 cluster place ISAEV near privacy/VPS networks Local BGP graph links AS200730 to upstream AS201814 and clusters it with AS210558 via shared BGP upstream; Tor Project notes both AS201814 and AS210558 in Tor-relay hosting context. |
| INFO | high | attribution | No direct Proton66/Stark tie established Direct searches and local graph review did not link AS200730, NovaHost, or 87.251.64.0/24 to Proton66 or Stark Industries Solutions. |
๐ณ๏ธ The Conspiratorial Read โ Questions & Calibrated Answers
Each answer states what the evidence supports and labels where a claim is unproven. Questions are instruments: they pry loose the partial truths the flat record hides.
โ What if 'Igor Isaev' is not a real operator but a strawman identity?
The identity is registered but only weakly corroborated (confidence: MEDIUM). A freshly-allocated single-/24 AS in a named individual's name, with a Russian maintainer and a .kz abuse address, fits a liability-sink pattern: the person on the RIPE record absorbs complaints while the operator stays behind novahost.kz's reseller curtain.
โ What if this isn't 'just' an SSH brute-force node?
The credential validation is plausibly secondary. The primary business signalled by the passive DNS โ Torzon/Abacus/DrugHub/Kerberos mirror domains โ is darknet-market and phishing hosting. The honeypot brute-forcing builds validated-access inventory; the marketplace hosting is the revenue engine.
โ Where does the money go, and who sits upstream?
The upstream is AS201814 (MEVSPACE, PL) with a sibling cluster at AS210558 (1337 Services GmbH / RDP.sh, DE) โ low-cost, privacy-tolerant VPS ecology. Cheap ASN allocation plus crypto-friendly resellers lowers abuse friction; following the money means following novahost.kz's payment rails and the markets' commission flows, not the RIPE record.
โ Is this tied to a known bulletproof brand like Proton66 or Stark?
No direct tie was established (stated explicitly, confidence HIGH that the link is unproven). The ecosystem adjacency is real; the specific affiliation is not โ we label it as an open question rather than assert it.
โ Which official body actually sponsored this autonomous system — and why is that the one blank in the record?
The exact sponsoring LIR is not explicit in the public aut-num object (INFERRED). For a structure assembled through a French broker, a Russian maintainer and a Kazakh name, the one detail left unstated is the one that would assign responsibility. The blank is not an oversight; in this trade it is the product.
โ Is there a state, military or intelligence hand behind ISAEV?
None documented — and we record that as a finding, not a silence (high confidence on the negative). The only state contact is Kazakhtelecom carrying DNS, which is infrastructural, not sponsorship. The honest map shows organised crime renting official rails, not a government operating them.
๐ Linked Dossiers
- TI-020A โ the master thesis this is a worked example of
- TI-019K "The Quadrant" โ w1n Ltd โ the UK parallel hosting darknet markets
- TI-020D โ Omegatech / Seychelles โ the offshore registration end of the same chain
๐ Sources & Evidence Chain (16 items)
Every claim above is anchored to a primary source. Full machine-readable evidence in Postgres dossier_intel (investigation 019M).