LSN โ€” Local Sovereign Network

๐Ÿ”ด CRITICAL โ€” Targeted Personal Attack ยท Credential Theft ยท Wife & Family Targeted ยท Post-Publication Surveillance ยท Multi-Nation Infrastructure

๐ŸŽฏ TI-2026-025A โ€” "The Personal Touch" โ€” A Targeted Campaign Against a Threat Researcher and His Family

TI-2026-025A ยท Series 1 of 5 ยท Confidence: HIGH ยท Sources: SSH Honeypot, RIPE NCC, Shodan, GreyNoise, AbuseIPDB, APNIC, PeeringDB, Passive DNS, OSINT

๐Ÿ”ด Executive Summary

Between March and June 2026, a sustained, multi-vector credential attack campaign targeted a single individual โ€” a threat intelligence researcher โ€” and his wife. The campaign was not opportunistic. It was personal. The attackers knew the target's full legal name, his wife's name, her email domain, internal service names, and passwords that existed only in private browser password managers and had never appeared in any public breach database.

The campaign decomposed into two distinct operational phases: Campaign A (19 IPs, 1,763 attempts, algorithmically-generated password variants) and Campaign B (23 IPs, 72+ surgical credential-stuffing attempts using actual stolen passwords). A single pivot IP bridged both campaigns โ€” proving shared infrastructure or shared actor behind the apparent separation.

This series documents the full forensic investigation. The infrastructure spans Poland (MEVSPACE bulletproof hosting, Windows attack platform with Rhadamanthys infostealer C2 on the same /22), Bangladesh (Grameen Communications, organization founded by a Nobel laureate who was literally the head of state during the attack period), Cambodia (CamGSM mobile relay), Thailand (UIH enterprise ISP sharing a unique SSH fingerprint with Grameen), Canada/USA (FranTech/BuyVM hosting the #2 global SSH scanner botnet), and the global infostealer market ecosystem that sourced the zero-breach credentials.

The most dangerous finding: the Rhadamanthys infostealer Command & Control server sits on the same /22 network block as the two primary attack IPs. The entire kill chain โ€” from credential theft to weaponized spraying โ€” may be operating within a single customer allocation at MEVSPACE, run by a positively identified individual: Adam Ochmanski, Warsaw, Poland.

Sources: SSH honeypot (cowrie); threat_intel PostgreSQL database; RIPE NCC; Shodan; GreyNoise; AbuseIPDB; APNIC; PeeringDB; Wayback Machine; GitHub threat-intel repositories.

๐Ÿงญ The Discovery

The campaign was detected because the target runs a Cowrie SSH honeypot on his home infrastructure. What began as routine brute-force noise became alarming on March 10โ€“20, 2026 when login attempts shifted from dictionary words to actual private credentials โ€” passwords the target recognized from his own password manager.

The forensic escalation path:

  1. Honeypot captures surgical credential attempts using private passwords (zero HIBP matches)
  2. Wife's credentials appear 8 days after husband's โ€” deliberate two-phase intelligence operation
  3. Credentials include private Calibre-Web password ([REDACTED]) from a service deployed on a non-standard port with no public indexing
  4. 326 algorithmically-generated password variants prove reverse-engineering of the target's password construction logic
  5. Cross-campaign pivot IP proves both campaigns share infrastructure
  6. OSINT enrichment reveals MEVSPACE bulletproof hosting, Grameen Communications (head of state connection), FranTech global botnet
  7. Post-dossier surveillance detected: MEVSPACE IP returns weekly for handshake-only probes after the target publishes initial findings

This is not spray-and-pray. This is someone who bought or stole specific credentials, studied the target's password construction habits, and deployed infrastructure across multiple continents to attack a single household.

Sources: cowrie honeypot sessions; honeypot_credentials table; HIBP API (0 results for private passwords); threat_intel.ips enrichment data.

โš”๏ธ Campaign A โ€” "The Wordlist Blitz"

19 IPs ยท 1,763 attempts ยท Algorithmically-generated passwords ยท Marchโ€“May 2026

Campaign A was the noisy phase โ€” high-volume credential testing using a custom wordlist. But this was not a generic dictionary. Forensic analysis of the 326 unique passwords revealed a reverse-engineered pattern derived from the target's actual password construction habits:

PatternExample (Redacted)Derivation Logic
Base + year suffix[base]2024, [base]2025Observed real password โ†’ append likely rotation years
Base + special chars[base]!, [base]@, [base]#1Common complexity additions to known base
CamelCase variations[Base]Word, [BASE]wordCase permutations of confirmed base string
Combined personal + service[name][service]Name + known service concatenation
Reversed strings[esab] โ†’ reverse of [base]String reversal of confirmed credentials

The wordlist proves the attacker possessed at least one real password before generating variations. They understood the target's cognitive pattern for creating passwords โ€” not just the passwords themselves. This level of derivation requires a human analyst studying the stolen credentials, not an automated spray tool.

InfrastructureIPsCountryRole
IONOS (1&1)5DE/GBCommodity VPS โ€” likely compromised or rented
OVH/OVHcloud4FR/DELow-KYC hosting
Contabo3DEBudget hosting, frequent abuse
DigitalOcean2US/NLEasily spun up/down
Others5MixedDistributed to avoid single-provider blocking

Sources: honeypot_credentials (326 unique passwords, 19 source IPs); password pattern analysis; threat_intel.ips for hosting providers.

๐ŸŽฏ Campaign B โ€” "The Credential Leak / OSINT Recon"

23 IPs ยท 72+ surgical attempts ยท Actual stolen passwords ยท Marchโ€“June 2026

Campaign B was the quiet, precise phase. Low volume, high accuracy. These were real passwords โ€” not variations, not guesses. The attacker possessed the target's actual credentials from multiple services:

Credential TypeSource ServiceHIBP StatusImplication
Private reading app passwordCalibre-Web (non-standard port)โŒ Zero resultsOnly source: browser password manager or infostealer
Email-derived usernameshuffle-on.com domainN/ADomain knowledge proves targeted research
Wife's reversed-name aliassonatural.life domainN/A8-day delay = separate intelligence-gathering operation
Service-specific passwordsMultiple internal servicesโŒ Zero resultsNever breached publicly โ€” infostealer origin

The 8-day gap between operator and wife credentials is operationally significant. It indicates two separate research/acquisition phases โ€” first the primary target, then the partner. This is not automated spraying. This is proxy targeting: attacking a person's family to apply pressure or find alternate access paths. In intelligence tradecraft, this is classified as a coercion/intimidation technique.

๐Ÿ” How did they know about Calibre-Web?

Calibre-Web runs on a non-standard port behind a reverse proxy with no public search engine indexing. The password for it ([REDACTED]) has zero results in Have I Been Pwned. The only path to this credential is: (1) browser password manager compromise via infostealer malware, (2) network interception during a login session, or (3) direct server compromise. Path (1) is overwhelmingly most likely given the infostealer market ecosystem documented in 025C.

Sources: honeypot_credentials; HIBP API lookups; Calibre-Web deployment records; sonatural.life DNS records.

๐Ÿ”— The Cross-Campaign Pivot

IP 87.106.149.146 (IONOS, DE) appeared in both Campaign A and Campaign B. This single shared node proves the campaigns are not independent โ€” they share infrastructure, and by extension, share an operator or operator group.

CampaignRole of 87.106.149.146Timing
Campaign AAlgorithm-generated password attemptsMarch 2026
Campaign BActual stolen credential attemptsApril 2026

The separation into two campaigns is therefore operational compartmentalization, not organizational separation. One group runs the noisy brute-force (testing password variations) and the quiet precision strikes (using known-good credentials) as two modes of the same operation.

Sources: honeypot_sessions cross-reference; IP appears in both campaign credential sets with different password types.

๐ŸŒ Infrastructure Geography

The campaign's infrastructure spans 6 countries across 4 continents, with distinct roles for each geographical cluster:

RegionProviderRoleDossier
๐Ÿ‡ต๐Ÿ‡ฑ PolandMEVSPACE (AS201814)Primary attack platform ยท Rhadamanthys C2 ยท Human operator025B
๐Ÿ‡ง๐Ÿ‡ฉ BangladeshGrameen Communications (AS58946)Persistent probing ยท Custom SSH tool ยท State transit025D
๐Ÿ‡ฐ๐Ÿ‡ญ CambodiaCamGSM (AS17976)Mobile relay ยท Shared Paramiko fingerprint with MEVSPACE025B
๐Ÿ‡น๐Ÿ‡ญ ThailandUIH (AS38794)Enterprise relay ยท Shared unique HASSH with Grameen025D
๐Ÿ‡จ๐Ÿ‡ฆ๐Ÿ‡บ๐Ÿ‡ธ Canada/USAFranTech/BuyVM (AS53667)Go scanner botnet (#2 global) ยท 1321 nodes025E
๐Ÿ‡ฉ๐Ÿ‡ช๐Ÿ‡ซ๐Ÿ‡ท๐Ÿ‡ฌ๐Ÿ‡ง EUIONOS, OVH, ContaboCommodity spray nodes ยท Campaign A infrastructureThis doc

The geographic spread is not random. It follows a pattern: bulletproof hosting for the human operator (MEVSPACE), institutional cover for persistent probing (Grameen/state telco), mobile anonymization for transit (CamGSM), botnet scale for noise (FranTech), and commodity VPS for disposable spray nodes (IONOS/OVH/Contabo).

Sources: threat_intel.ips; honeypot enrichment data; RIPE/APNIC WHOIS; GreyNoise classifications.

๐Ÿ‘๏ธ Post-Publication Surveillance

After the target published initial findings (first dossier: April 25, 2026), the MEVSPACE IP 195.3.220.7 returned on a weekly cadence with a new behavioral pattern: SSH handshake only, no credentials attempted.

DateIPBehaviorUsernamePassword
2026-05-31195.3.220.7SSH handshake, no authnullnull
2026-06-03195.3.220.7SSH handshake, no authnullnull
2026-06-11195.3.220.7SSH handshake, no authnullnull

This is surveillance behavior. The operator shifted from active exploitation to passive monitoring after becoming aware the target was investigating them. The weekly cadence suggests an automated check ("is the honeypot still running?") rather than active attack. The operator is aware they are being watched and is watching back.

Sources: honeypot_sessions for 195.3.220.7 (sessions with null credentials post May-25); timing correlation with dossier-008 publication date.

โฑ๏ธ Timeline: Campaign Predates Publication

A critical finding from temporal analysis: the campaign began before any dossier was published, eliminating simple retaliation as the primary motive.

DateEventSignificance
~Mar 10โ€“20, 2026First Campaign B credentials appear in honeypotAttack begins
Mar 20โ€“Apr 20Campaign A ramps up (algorithmically-generated variants)Operator has studied the passwords
Apr 25, 2026First dossier (008) published on shuffle-on.comTarget goes public
May 25, 2026Second dossier (011) published with OSINT profilesAll 33 IPs named
May 31, 2026MEVSPACE returns โ€” surveillance mode beginsOperator aware of exposure
Jun 11, 2026Last observed MEVSPACE probeStill monitoring

The campaign was triggered by credential acquisition (an infostealer log becoming available for purchase), not by the target's research activities. However, the post-publication surveillance shift proves the operator reads the publications and adapts.

Sources: honeypot session timestamps; shuffle-on.com publication dates; dossier-008 and 011 metadata.

๐Ÿ“Š Attribution Probability Matrix

Based on all evidence gathered across the investigation, the following probability-weighted hypotheses explain the campaign's origin:

HypothesisProbabilityKey EvidenceDetailed In
Infostealer market chain55%Zero-HIBP credentials; Rhadamanthys C2 same /22; domain-searchable markets; password derivation logic025C
Threat actor retaliation25%ISAEV named by legal name in prior dossier; ASN only 37 days old when documented; strong motivation024A
Supply-chain targeting12%Target works at Digital Science (Springer Nature parent); access to academic infrastructure; APT-relevantThis doc
State actor operation5%Grameen/head-of-state transit; DGFI capability; Bangladesh intelligence structure025D
Insider knowledge3%Specificity of internal service knowledge; low probability but non-zeroโ€”

Note: These are not mutually exclusive. The most likely scenario is a composite chain: credentials stolen by commodity infostealer โ†’ sold on market โ†’ purchased by actor with specific interest in this target (retaliation or supply-chain motivation) โ†’ weaponized with human-level password analysis โ†’ deployed via bulletproof infrastructure.

๐Ÿ“– Reading Between the Lines

  • Why target a threat researcher's wife? In intelligence operations, targeting family members serves two purposes: (1) finding alternate credentials that share the same network, and (2) applying psychological pressure. The 8-day gap proves this was deliberate, not automated spillover.
  • Why does the post-publication behavior matter? An operator who reads your dossiers and adjusts behavior is not a bot. This is a human adversary who considers you a threat and monitors your output.
  • What does MEVSPACE + Rhadamanthys same /22 mean? It means the person who stole the credentials (via infostealer) and the person who used them (via MEVSPACE SSH) may be the same operator โ€” or at minimum, share infrastructure allocated from the same bulletproof provider.
  • Why Grameen โ€” a Nobel laureate's organization? Because it's invisible. Dead abuse contacts, hijacked domain, state telco transit. If you wanted persistent access nobody could report or investigate, you'd pick exactly this.
  • Why the Go botnet (FranTech)? Cover noise. Thousands of IPs doing millions of SSH attempts globally โ€” the targeted credentials hidden in the flood are invisible to anyone not running a honeypot.

๐Ÿ” The Conspirative Questions

What if the infostealer and the attacker are the same entity?

The Rhadamanthys C2 at 195.3.223.218 and the attack IPs at 195.3.220.7/.88 share the same /22 allocation at MEVSPACE. One customer allocation could run both the stealer infrastructure (infecting victims, collecting logs) and the exploitation phase (using those logs against specific targets). This would eliminate the "market" intermediary entirely โ€” the operator may have direct access to stolen credentials without purchasing them.

What if this is not about credentials at all?

The post-publication surveillance shift suggests the operator's interest may have evolved beyond credential theft. The weekly handshake probes serve no exploitation purpose โ€” they are intelligence collection about the target's defensive posture. This may have become a monitoring operation rather than an access operation.

What if the head of state connection is not coincidental?

Muhammad Yunus controlled the Chief Adviser's Office which commanded both BTCL (carrying all Grameen traffic) and NSI (civilian intelligence). The custom HASSH fingerprint on only 3 IPs worldwide (2 Grameen + 1 UIH Thailand) proves a bespoke tool deployed by a specific operator โ€” not random compromise. Whether state-directed or insider-enabled, the structural capability exists. See 025D.

What if the OPSEC breach (Facebook post) was the trigger?

The target posted about his homelab on Facebook with identifiable details. This post is publicly accessible and could have been used for reconnaissance. If an attacker was already in possession of stolen credentials (from an infostealer log), the Facebook post provided the operational context: "this person has SSH services, here is their domain, this is worth attacking." The post may have been the catalyst that turned dormant credentials into an active campaign.

๐Ÿ” Questions We Cannot Answer (Yet)

Q: Who purchased the infostealer log containing my credentials?

A: The market operates on Telegram and requires cryptocurrency. Transaction records exist but are not accessible without law enforcement cooperation. We know the product exists (Russian Market, 2easy, Genesis). We know the buyer exists. We cannot name them yet.

Q: Is Adam Ochmanski (MEVSPACE) a willing participant or a negligent provider?

A: Both scenarios are documented in 025B. MEVSPACE's abuse response rate is 0%. Their infrastructure hosts Rhadamanthys C2 servers. They were notified via CERT-PL with no response. Whether Ochmanski personally operates the attack infrastructure or merely profits from hosting it โ€” the outcome for my family is identical.

Q: Why does a Nobel laureate's telecommunications company attack a random Romanian DevOps engineer?

A: It probably doesn't, knowingly. The more likely explanation is that Grameen's infrastructure (dead WHOIS contacts, expired abuse paths, state telco transit) has been compromised or rented by a third party who values exactly its invisibility. But "probably doesn't" is not "certainly doesn't" โ€” and the custom HASSH fingerprint shared with only 2 other IPs worldwide cannot be dismissed as random compromise.

Q: What happens after this is published?

A: Based on prior pattern: the MEVSPACE operator will read this within days (they monitor these publications). The surveillance probes will likely continue or escalate. Nothing will happen to Grameen. CERT-PL will not act on MEVSPACE. And I will keep documenting.

๐Ÿ”— Cross-References

๐Ÿ“‹ Methodology Note
This investigation was conducted using: a Cowrie SSH honeypot (capturing full session transcripts), threat intelligence databases (8,000+ enriched attacker IPs), RIPE/APNIC registry data, Shodan/GreyNoise/AbuseIPDB enrichment, PeeringDB infrastructure mapping, Wayback Machine corporate archaeology, GitHub-hosted threat intelligence feeds, and active reconnaissance via Tor-routed scanning. All credentials are redacted in this publication. Full unredacted data is retained in the investigation database for law enforcement purposes. No offensive actions were taken against any identified infrastructure.

๐Ÿ’ก Why This Matters Beyond One Family

If you use a browser password manager, your credentials may already be for sale. Rhadamanthys, Lumma, Raccoon, RedLine โ€” these infostealers harvest everything: saved passwords, cookies, crypto wallets, session tokens. The gap between "my password was stolen" and "someone is trying it against my SSH server" was approximately 2-3 weeks in this case.

If you run self-hosted services: you are not invisible. Non-standard ports, missing public indexing, private domains โ€” none of these are protection against an adversary who has your browser's password database.

If you publish threat intelligence: expect retaliation. Not maybe. Certainly. The operator adapted their behavior within 6 days of the first publication. This is the cost of transparency.

We do care. We do make mistakes. But we stay in truth. And we are not hiding.

โš  Personal capacity. Research published independently โ€” not reflecting employer views. Derived from passive observation of attacks against personal infrastructure. Full disclaimer โ†’
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